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ABSTRACT
Over the last few decades, there has been greater recognition that increased time
on death row is a significant problem in the United States that is getting worse. Beginning
with the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas (514 U.S. 1045,
1995), numerous defendants have attempted to assert Eighth Amendment claims of cruel
and unusual punishment on the grounds that the length of their death row confinement
combined with their subsequent execution is unconstitutional. Although such claims have
been unsuccessful in the U.S. Supreme Court, other federal courts have examined the
issue. In 2014, the Central District of California struck down California’s death penalty
system on Eighth Amendment grounds, claiming that the system at the time,
characterized by very lengthy periods of death row confinement, in no way furthered the
death penalty’s two classic penological purposes of deterrence or retribution (Jones v.
Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Although this decision was later
overturned on procedural grounds, it represented the first instance in which a federal
judge ruled a death penalty system unconstitutional, citing lengthy death row
confinement as the core issue. The number of ways in which defendants can appeal their
death sentences has increased significantly since the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in
Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153, 1976). Undoubtedly, the appeals process plays a critical
role in lengthy death row confinement. However, less known are the reasons that such
lengthy appeals processes have become so commonplace. Using data on defendants
iv

sentenced to death in Florida from 1975-2013 (N=406), this study examines the role of
case complexity in predicting increased time on death row and ultimately delay. In
addition, other appellate-level and case-level variables are considered. Finally,
implications for policy and directions for future research are presented.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Long periods of death row confinement are a major problem in the United States.
Justice Stephen Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross (135 S. Ct. 2726, 2015)
illustrates the essence of the problem. After addressing the potentially unreliable and
arbitrary nature of the American death penalty in Parts I and II of his dissent in Glossip,
Justice Breyer begins Part III of his opinion with the following observation:
“The problems of reliability and unfairness almost inevitably lead to a third independent
constitutional problem: excessively long periods of time that individuals typically spend
on death row, alive but under sentence of death. That is to say, delay is in part a problem
that the Constitution’s own demands create…”(Glossip 135 S. Ct. at 2764, Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
It is clear from Justice Breyer’s dissent that the Supreme Court should treat death as quite
distinct from other forms of punishment. It should come as no surprise that adjudicating
death penalty cases will take longer than other criminal cases. The problem, however, as
Justice Breyer attempts to illustrate in his dissent, is that this issue, paradoxically, has
come to pass largely in the years since the U.S. Supreme Court began implementing
measures to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. Such measures were intended
to yield a more predictable capital punishment process and a relatively small number of
death row inmates who spend shorter amounts of time on death row. This has not,
however, been the result.
1

Further discussion about the time American capital defendants spend on death
row as well as some factors that contribute to longer periods under death row
confinement is instructive. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, the amount of
time capital defendants spend on death row is steadily increasing (Latzer & Cauthen,
2007). From 1977-1983, death row inmates spent an average of 51 months on death row,
and the trend has continued upward ever since (Latzer & Cauthen, 2007). In 2005, the
average stint on death row had increased to 147 months (Latzer & Cauthen, 2007), up
from about 132 months in 2004 (Snell, 2011). As of 2012, this figure had increased to
190 months and dipped only slightly to 186 months in 2013 (Snell, 2014). Justice Breyer
notes the following in Glossip:
“Nearly half of the 3,000 inmates now on death row have been there for more than 15
years. And, at present execution rates, it would take more than 75 years to carry out those
3,000 death sentences; thus, the average person on death row would spend an additional
37.5 years there before being executed.” (Glossip 135 S. Ct. at 2764-65, Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
But is an upward trend in the amount of time spent on death row necessarily an indicator
of excessive delay? The answer may rest largely on how one defines delay. In any event,
delay requires one to look beyond the amount of time that has passed between sentencing
and execution. This is especially true given that the Supreme Court has built an entire
body of legal protections and procedures that will result in the passage of some
additional, but acceptable time in order to litigate the various issues that arise.
In terms of the upward trend in the amount of time defendants are spending on
death row, several factors may be at play. First, the U.S. Supreme Court has encouraged
and imposed stricter standards for death penalty appeals, sometimes referred to as super
due process (Cauthen & Latzer, 2000). Namely, as a result of the Court’s decision in
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Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153, 1976), death penalty cases must proceed in a bifrucated
manner with guilt and sentencing occurring as two independent processes (Cauthen &
Latzer, 2007). In addition, although not constitutionally required, many states require
death sentences to be automatically appealed to the state’s court of last resort, a process
known as proportionality review (Cauthen & Latzer, 2000). Finally, capital cases by their
nature present more legal issues overall, particularly on appeal, than non-capital cases
(Cauthen & Latzer, 2000). A recent U.S. District Court ruling in California has left little
doubt that the number of appeals available to defendants and the number of issues that
may arise on appeal play a significant role in death row stints that can last, on average, 25
years (Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d. 1050, Dist. Court, CD California, 2014).
Specifically, regarding the issue of automatic review, California is one state that
does not require such review (Shatz, 2015). California’s method for meeting the Supreme
Court’s requirement of narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants relies on a firstdegree murder statute that contains special circumstances under which such cases become
capital (Shatz, 2015)1. Paradoxically, however, California has included so many of these
special circumstances in its first-degree murder statute that it has created a massive group

1

California’s “Special Circumstances” are spelled out in CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2(a) and include the
following: “other murder” circumstances: the defendant was convicted of more than one murder ((a)(3)) or
was previously convicted of murder ((a)(2)); “victim” circumstances: the defendant intentionally killed
peace officer ((a)(7)), federal law enforcement officer or agent ((a)(8)), firefighter ((a)(9)), witness
((a)(10)), prosecutor or former prosecutor ((a)(11)), judge or former judge ((a)(12)), elected official or
former elected official ((a)(13)) or juror ((a)(20)); “manner” circumstances: the murder was committed by a
destructive device, bomb or explosive planted ((a)(4)) or mailed ((a)(6)) or was intentionally committed by
lying in wait ((a)(15)), by the infliction of torture ((a)(18)), by poison ((a)(19)) or by shooting from a motor
vehicle ((a)(21)); “motive” circumstances: the defendant committed the murder for financial gain ((a)(1)),
to escape arrest ((a)(5)), because of the victim’s race, color, religion, national origin or country of origin
((a)(16)) or to further the activities of a criminal street gang ((a)(22); “commission of a felony”
circumstances: the murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or an accomplice to robbery
((a)(17)(A)), kidnapping ((a)(17)(B)), rape ((a)(17)(C)), forcible sodomy ((a)(17)(D)), child molestation
((a)(17)(E)), forcible oral copulation ((a)(17)(F)), burglary ((a)(17)(G)), arson ((a)(17)(H)), train wrecking
((a)(17)(I)), mayhem ((a)(17)(J)), rape by instrument ((a)(17)(K)) or carjacking ((a)(17)(L)); and “catchall”
circumstance: the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel ((a)(14)) (Shatz, 2015).
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of death-eligible defendants (Shatz, 2015). Although the U.S. Supreme Court determined
in Pulley v. Harris (465 U.S. 37, 1984) that automatic or proportionality review is not
constitutionally required, California’s death penalty system demonstrates that without
such review, the Court’s requirement that states narrow the class of death-eligible
defendants is not being met and ultimately, lengthy periods of death row confinement can
result.
Other reasons for delay, particularly in California but perhaps in other states as
well, include habeas corpus appeals, the time required to procure appellate counsel, the
time required for appellate counsel to become familiar with the trial record in a case and
the time required for the state’s court of last resort to place a case on its docket and
ultimately render a decision (Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d. 1050, Dist. Court, CD
California, 2014). Again, reasonably lengthy periods of death row confinement should be
expected. Certainly, if no process existed that permitted death row inmates to challenge
their death sentences or if states did not impose additional safeguards, the result could, at
worst, be a system in which death sentences are handed down in an unusually high
number of cases and in which executions are administered in a completely indiscriminate
fashion.
The issue of increased time on death row rightfully leads to a discussion about the
costs of the death penalty. Although there is no uniform method for determining the
precise cost of administering the death penalty (Dieter, 2009), the general consensus is
that states pay more annually to maintain their individual death penalty systems than they
would pay maintaining a system in which life imprisonment is the maximum allowable
penalty (Dieter, 2009). On average, only about 1 in 10 death sentences result in an
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execution (Dieter, 2009). Thus, the costs to states of maintaining their death penalty
systems do not typically reflect the costs of those cases in which an execution occurs and
instead, are more representative of the trials and appeals processes that occur across all
cases (Dieter, 2009). It is estimated that death penalty cases cost about $1 million more
than non-capital cases (Dieter, 2009). However, only 1 in 3 death penalty cases results in
a death sentence, meaning that states pay roughly $3 million more to sentence a person to
death than to hand down non-capital sanctions (Dieter, 2009). If only about 1 in 10 death
sentences result in an execution, that means that each execution costs states roughly $30
million dollars more to impose than a non-capital sanction (Dieter, 2009). To put it
simply, the death penalty creates a huge cost to states’ taxpayers and in most cases, the
ultimate sanction is never imposed. It is important to note that these are national
estimates and that these figures may be even larger depending on the state under
examination.
A recent study examining county-level tax information in Texas found that capital
trials lead to both an increase in property taxes and a decrease in funding for other public
safety measures (Lundberg, 2019). In his work, Lundberg (2019) found that in the years
in which any particular county in Texas experiences a capital trial, the average increase in
local property taxes is around 2% or about $660,000. In terms of the reduction in public
safety expenditures, Lundberg (2019) estimates that any given county could reduce such
expenditures by about $1.4 million provided that the entire process, defined as the period
from offense date to the conclusion of the trial, lasts approximately one year. Recent data
out of Louisiana further illustrates the problem of cost. In their work, Johnson and
Quigley (2019) found that the state of Louisiana has spent approximately $200 million
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over the last 15 years administering its death penalty. In that period, however, the state
has only executed one person. Further, Louisiana has only executed 10 persons out of the
242 the state has sentenced to death since 1976 or about 4.1% (Johnson and Quigley,
2019). Thus, whether examining the last several years or going back decades, it is easy to
question whether maintaining the death penalty in Louisiana is worth the cost.
One important question remains. What is delay? For purposes of this research,
delay is defined as the cumulative amount of time that a defendant has spent on death row
less the time taken for a state’s court of last resort to render a decision in an automatic
appeal. Given that lengthy appeals processes appear to be a significant contributing factor
in extended periods of death row confinement, the point at which a decision is rendered
in an automatic appeal seems an appropriate starting point. The present research draws on
information from death row inmates in the state of Florida, a state that requires all death
sentences to be automatically appealed to the state’s Supreme Court.2
One of the criticisms that has arisen regarding the issue of excessive delay is that
states may be to blame, in part, for excessive case processing time in ways that go well
beyond the mere provision of post-conviction appeals. In fact, Justice Breyer makes this
point on several occasions in a series of cases in which defendants attempted,
unsuccessfully, to challenge the constitutionality of their death sentences in part based on
delay. Justice Breyer’s criticisms center on both the cruel and unusual nature of delay.
Specifically, Justice Breyer argues that delay may be considered cruel especially when it
is the result of faulty state appellate procedures (Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944, 1998;
Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S. Ct. 541, 2009; Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S.Ct. 1299).
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See Florida Statute 921.141(4).
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Justice Breyer has also argued that delay is almost certainly unusual when a defendant
has spent 27 years on death row; in light of the fact that the average death row stint in the
United States was around 11 or 12 years at the time the Supreme Court denied certiorari
in Foster v. Florida (537 U.S. 990, 2002), a figure that is undoubtedly higher today.
Finally, according to Justice Breyer, the cruelty of executing a defendant after a long
period of delay is exacerbated when the defendant has reached a severely diminished
physical or mental state (Allen v. Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136, 2006). Although Justice
Breyer has been championing the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in a delay related
case for the last 2 decades, the empirical criminological literature has ignored the issue of
death penalty delay. Without empirical analysis, defendants may have a difficult time
successfully raising constitutional claims based on delay given the lack of specific factors
defendants could identify as the cause of their delay. However, if such analysis were
present and defendants could make constitutional claims based on the disparate impact of
the death penalty, it is possible that similar claims could be made based on delay.
Additional factors, such as case complexity, could also play a role in the delay of
capital cases. Although death row inmates in the United States are afforded numerous
post-conviction appeals, this fact alone cannot fully explain the inordinate amount of time
spent on death row. It is possible that extended case processing time created by states in
the post-conviction process is much more complex than we realize. Therefore, a more
nuanced analysis of time on death row is needed.
One approach that may be useful to our understanding of delay comes from the
literature that examines the nexus between case complexity and case processing time
(Cauthen & Latzer, 2008; Cauthen & Latzer, 2000; Ford, 2014; Heise, 2004; Lempert,
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1981; Reiber & Weinberg, 2009; Sutton, 1990; Tidmarsh, 1992). However, these works
often appear in legal or political science literature and not criminology and criminal
justice journals. The works of Cauthen and Latzer (2008; 2000) attempt to empirically
test the relationship between these two issues but are methodologically limited.
This project will attempt to fill a significant gap in the literature by defining and
specifically examining delay. This project will examine the intersection between case
complexity and death penalty delay. The goal of this research is to determine whether
case complexity can be used, at least in part, to explain the inordinate delays that so many
defendants experience between the disposition of an automatic appeal and their
execution.
This dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 (LITERATURE REVIEW)
will begin by broadly addressing the philosophical underpinnings of punishment and how
specific philosophies of punishment can be applied to modern day capital punishment. In
addition, this chapter will discuss the jurisprudential history of the death penalty in the
United States and address various constitutional issues related to the methods and modes
of execution. Additionally, Chapter 2 will examine the recent U.S. District Court ruling
Jones v. Chappell (31 F. Supp. 3d. 1050, Dist. Court, CD California, 2014) and discuss
the legal history of Lackey claims3 and how they fit within the larger discussion of delay
in capital cases. Finally, Chapter 2 will address the potential negative impacts of
excessive delay on death row inmates; including a discussion of Dr. Stuart Grassian’s
work on the death row phenomenon.

3

In short, a Lackey Claim is a claim that a death row defendant’s extended period on
death row combined with their subsequent execution violates the cruel and unusual
provision of the Eighth Amendment.
8

Chapter 3 (METHODS) will lay out the methodological justification for the
present study. Importantly, this chapter will propose a definition for delay. Also, Chapter
3 will discuss the independent variables used in this study and their empirical
foundations. Finally, Chapter 3 will explain the data collection process and the
hypotheses to be tested.
Chapter 4 (ANALYSIS) will discuss the two statistical methods to be used for
analyzing the data and testing the various independent variables against the dependent
variable of delay (and time on death row as a point of comparison). In addition, this
chapter will explain the categories that the researcher used in order to group the
independent variables. Chapter 4 will also include the coding mechanism for each of the
variables of interest, the diagnostics used to assess multicollinearity and tests used to
assess model fit.
Chapter 5 (RESULTS) will present the results of each of the models and provide a
breakdown of the notable results.
Finally, Chapter 6 (DISCUSSION) will examine the results of the study and
provide possible explanations for those results. This chapter will also provide suggestions
for methodological and analytical improvement for future studies and propose a new
standard for prosecutors to use in capital cases that could serve to more effectively
narrow the class of death-eligible defendants and reduce the processing time for capital
cases nationwide.

9

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW
Support for and Opposition to the Death Penalty in the United States
In modern religious traditions, the death penalty has often been met with fierce
oppostion. Such opposition is evident in that many religions have established an official
stance opposing the death penalty. Table 2.1 provides a sample of several religions’ and
denominations’ official stance on the death penalty.
Table 2.1-Major Religions’ and Denominations’ Stance on the Death Penalty
Religion
Support
Oppose
Christianity
American Baptist Church

X

The Episcopal Church

X

Evangelical Lutheran Church of America

X

Presbyterian Church USA

X

The Roman Catholic Church

X

Southern Baptism

X

The United Methodist Church

X

Islam

X

Judaism

X
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Table 2.1-Major Religions’ and Denominations’ Stance on the Death Penalty
(cont.)
Religion
Support
Oppose
Buddhism

X

Hinduism

X

Source: Death Penalty Information Center (2019). Retrieved from
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/facts-and-research/religious-statements/officialreligious-statements.

Overall, Table 2.1 reveals that the death penalty does not find a great deal of
support on religious grounds. Many of the above religions and denominations have long
held to their stances on the death penalty, often citing the practice as inconsistent with
their teachings and emphasizing the value of every human life. In spite of many religions’
long held opposition to the practice, it was not until 2018 that Pope Francis took the
monumental step of changing the official stance of the Catholic Church on the death
penalty, declaring it “inadmissible” and not in line with the beliefs of the church
(Bordoni, 2018).
Despite many major religions and denominations officially denouncing the
practice, public support for the death penalty remains relatively high. According to a
recent Gallup poll, 55% of adults in the United States favor the death penalty for persons
convicted of murder (Gallup, 2017). Although according to Gallup (2017) the percentage
of Americans who support the death penalty has declined steadily since the mid-1990s,
support for the death penalty has not dropped below 50% since the mid-1960s. Other
polls reveal comparable levels of support for the death penalty although there is some
evidence that there has been a steady decline in support from its peak in the 1990’s.
Recent Pew Research Center data and CBS polls show that 56% of Americans support
11

the death penalty (Dutton, de Pinto, Salvanto & Backus, 2015). Oliphant (2016), more
recently, noted that the percentage of Americans in support of the death penalty may now
be as low as 49%, which would be among the first polls to put support for capital
punishment at less than 50% since the mid-1960’s. In any event, each poll suggests that
support for the death penalty is at its lowest levels in 40 years (Dutton et al., 2015;
Oliphant, 2016).
The American public’s continued support for the death penalty may be linked to
the perception that it is fairly imposed. According to Gallup (2017), 51% of Americans
believe that the death penalty is applied fairly. Although this figure represents a narrow
majority and is down from its peak of 61% in 2005, many Americans still believe that the
sentence is fair (Gallup, 2017). The belief that the death penalty is morally justified may
also explain its continued support. For instance, Dutton et al. (2015) report that 63% of
Americans believe that the death penalty is a morally justified punishment in cases of
murder. That is to say that a majority of Americans believe that the evils of capital
murder itself outweigh the moral costs of government sanctioned executions.
Continued public support for the death penalty, however, has not resulted in its
increased use in recent years. Since 2007, eleven states (Connecticut4, Delaware, Illinois,
Maryland, Nebraska5, New Jersey, New Hampshire, New Mexico6, New York, Utah7 and
Washington) have abolished the death penalty (Death Penalty Information Center, 2019).
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Connecticut’s overturning of the death penalty does not apply retroactively to those
already under sentence of death and only requires that subsequent convicted murderers
be, at most, sentenced to life without the possibility of parole.
5
Nebraska has since reinstated the death penalty by way of popular referendum.
6
New Mexico’s overturning of the death penalty does not apply retroactively to those
already under sentence of death.
7
Utah has since reinstated the death penalty.
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Overall, 21 states and the District of Columbia do not have the death penalty (Death
Penalty Information Center, 2019). In addition, since 2011, four states’ governors
(California, Colorado, Oregon and Pennsylvania) have imposed moratoriums on their
respective states’ death penalty systems (Death Penalty Information Center, 2019).
Nationwide, 2014 saw the lowest number of executions since the U.S. Supreme
Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153, 1976) and one of
the lowest numbers of executions on record (Gallup, 2017).8 Although there has been a
slight upward trend over the last few years (2016-2018), the national rate of executions
remains very low.9 However, despite an increasing trend in death penalty abolitions by
state legislatures and an increasing unwillingness of those states that retain the death
penalty to actually carry out executions, public support remains high.
Support for the death penalty can be gleaned from other sources as well. Except
for the four-year moratorium on executions following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in
Furman v. Georgia (408 U.S. 238, 1972), the Court has stopped well short of abolishing
the practice altogether. Instead, the Court has focused heavily on trying to narrow the
class of death-eligible defendants. The Supreme Court has also addressed a number of
issues ranging from lethal injection protocols and the types of drugs that can be used in
executions (Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 2008; Glossip v. Gross, 135 U.S. 2726, 2015) to
whether and to what extent the death penalty can be imposed upon individuals with
intellectual deficiencies (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 534, 2002; Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S.
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35 people were executed nationwide in 2014, followed by just 28 executions nationwide
in 2015 (Death Penalty Information Center, 2016).
9
Nationwide, there were 20 executions in 2016, 23 executions in 2017 and 25
excecutions in 2018 (Death Penalty Information Center, 2019).
13

___, 2014). Finally, the Court has addressed the importance of mitigation (factors that
serve to diminish a defendant’s culpability to commit capital murder) in cases such as
Woodson v. North Carolina (428 U.S. 280, 1976), Lockett v. Ohio (438 U.S. 538, 1978)
and Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 551, 2005).
Before addressing the jurisprudential history of the death penalty in the United
States, it is important to briefly discuss the various philosophies of punishment and how
they may inform our contemporary death pealty practices. The following section will
draw upon the works of Hobbes, Plato, Bentham and Beccaria among others to illustrate
the philosophical development of punishment over time and conflicting views about the
purpose of punishment.
The Philosophy of Punishment
An understanding of why the death penalty is deeply embedded into American
jurisprudence requires consideration of its historical and philosophical underpinnings and
purpose. Although public support for the death penalty in the United States remains
relatively high (see Dutton et al., 2015; Gallup, 2015), the public largely views the death
penalty as an ineffective deterrent to crime (Dutton et al., 2015). But how did the concept
of deterrence or other justifications for the death penalty come to be a part of how we
view capital punishment?
A starting point for this discussion can be found in the early work of philosopher
Thomas Hobbes and his ideas about the role of government in creating a civilized
society. Hobbes’s book, Leviathan, written in 1651, describes a mythical creature
consisting of a central figure and several tentacles protruding in several directions. The
purpose of depicting such a figure of course is not to recount the exploits of a mythical
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sea creature. Rather, this fictional creature is intended as a metaphor for how civilized
society should function. The central figure represents a civilized state advanced by a
central government while each of the protruding tentacles represents those nongovernmental actors who have a responsibility to contribute to a civilized state (Hobbes,
1651). According to Hobbes, humans would exist in a state of nature in which every
person is responsible for his own well-being. In such a state, humans are cutthroat and
live an extremely violent and brutish existence (Hobbes, 1651). However, according to
Hobbes, humankind would prefer to exist in a more peaceable state. Such a state is
possible when peace and order are created as a result of a social contract. Leviathan
serves as the root of our ideas about the social contract or the idea that those in power
have a responsibility to provide security to society. In exchange, individuals must be civil
and law abiding (Hobbes, 1651). Hobbes’s ideas about the social contract inform our
contemporary ideas about punishment by suggesting that a government figure is
necessary to serve as a check on individuals who may otherwise desire to live violently;
absent such control. The government not only retains the right to punish individuals who
violate the social contract, but also has a responsibility to punish. Absent such a
responsibility, human beings may be inclined to revert to a state of nature, counter to
their innate desires of a peaceable existence.
Individual responsibility to live peaceably and government responsibility to
punish those who undermine peace are necessary to maintain order. However, several
questions arise regarding punishment. Does punishment contribute to order maintenance
by correcting some sort of imbalance created by those who violate the social contract?
Should the purpose of punishment be to restrict one’s liberty such that further violations
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of the social contract are impossible? Is the purpose of punishment to discourage society
from violating the social contract? Or is it perhaps that punishment is meant to be solely
retributive? Most important for our current inquiry is how do our ideas about punishment
inform the use of the death penalty in America? What follows is a brief examination of
the philosophical roots of utilitarianism, deterrence (related to utilitarianism) and
retribution and how each of these philosophical ideas informs our understanding of the
death penalty.
Utilitarianism. The use of punishment to correct undesirable behavior dates to
ancient Greece. In his early work Protagorus, Greek philosopher Plato discussed the idea
of righteousness and how it is essentially a learned behavior. Plato believed that
influencing one’s behavior through the punishment of socially unacceptable behavior was
possible. These ancient ideas inform our modern ideas about punishment as a means of
reformation. Reformation of the individual however, as discussed by Plato, is only part of
the equation. When someone engages in socially unacceptable behavior, such as crime,
there is always some type of societal harm. In the context of the death penalty, however,
it is difficult to say which side Plato would have taken. For instance, Plato may have
believed that even for the worst of the worst, these individuals could have been reformed
through some other sanction. By the same token, it is possible that Plato would have
viewed death as the only acceptable form of punishment for taking a life and that reform
was not possible for the worst of society.
Utilitarianism views punishment not merely as the infliction of pain as a response
to moral wrongdoing but justified insomuch as it serves to restore harmony. Philospoher
and reformist Jeremy Bentham espoused a utilitarian view of punishment (Bentham,
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1789). Bentham placed emphasis on punishments that bring about the greatest degree of
happiness to society (Bentham, 1789). According to Bentham, punishment is evil and is
only just when the happiness achieved by society in inflicting the punishment outweighs
the evils in its mode or application (Bentham, 1789). Bentham staunchly opposed the
death penalty; although he did not appear to provide an alternative mode of punishment
for capital crimes (Bentham, 1789). Alternatively, John Stuart Mill did not view
punishment as inherently evil. Mill rejected the concept of the social contract but did
believe that people should be held accountable for some actions that are harmful to others
and that it is society’s responsibility to punish wrongdoing (Mill, 1869). Mill, unlike
Bentham, supported capital punishment and defended the practice primarily for its
deterrent value (Mill, 1869). Mill’s views, as espoused in On Liberty, were largely
centered on the idea that society will continue to progress (Mill, 1869). As such, Mill
argued in an 1868 speech given to the House of Commons in England that as society
progresses, the process for determining guilt and imposing the death sentence would also
progress, diminishing concerns about executing innocent persons. The question today
then is whether Mill’s views of a progressively better way of imposing the death penalty
has been achieved and if not, whether it can actually be achieved.
Bentham and Mill were not alone among prominent philosophers in believing that
punishment should serve a utilitarian purpose. John Locke shared this view as well and
regarding the death penalty, Locke believed that its purpose should be reformatory and
that some greater good must be achieved by society (Calvert, 1993). One criticism of this
view, however, is that the death penalty cannot be considered reformatory even if some
greater societal good is achieved (Calvert, 1993). This is due to its finality. Further,
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complexities arise when trying to determine the actual threshold for “greater good.” The
meaning of greater good rests on where one sits and one’s own individual beliefs.
Deterrence. Contemporary ideas about deterrence have their roots in the 1764
writings of Cesare Beccaria. Deterrence has three primary tenets; certainty, severity and
celerity or swiftness of punishment in discouraging criminal behavior (Beccaria, 1764). A
punishment is said to be a general deterrent if its imposition discourages society from
committing a particular crime after weighing its costs and benefits (Wright, 2010). On the
other hand, a punishment is a specific deterrent if the individual against whom the
punishment is imposed determines that the costs (i.e. the pain) of the punishment
outweigh any and all benefits of committing the same crime in the future (Beccaria,
1764). These basic ideas about deterrence are ones that have been reinforced over the
centuries since Beccaria first proposed them.
Jeffrey Reiman (1990) acknowledges that, empirically speaking, the death penalty
has typically not been found to be any greater a deterrent to committing murder than life
imprisonment. Support for the notion that the death penalty is not an effective deterrent to
capital murder as been reinforced time and again in subsequent empirical inquiries.10
Further, Reiman (1990) questions what he refers to as the “common sense” view of the
death penalty. According to Reiman (1990), people support the death penalty because
they assume that death is the most frightening experience one can have. Therefore, if
people want to avoid something as terrifying as death, they will refrain from committing
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See National Research Council of the National Academies (2012). Deterrence and the
Death Penalty. This report summarizes several decades of research and recommends that
policymakers not utilize any research assessing whether capital punishment has any
impact on homicide rates.
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murder. Reiman (1990), however, argues that life imprisonment is not necessarily less
frightening than death or that life imprisonment is incapable of deterring people from
committing murder.
Immanuel Kant’s view of morality may go a long way in explaining why the
death penalty is not an effective deterrent to murder. Kant’s view of the moral person
essentially posits that people who engage in dishonest or deviant behavior do not
recognize that they are contradicting themselves (Kant, 1785). Put another way, a person
who commits a crime for purposes of depriving someone of a certain right does not
realize that they are depriving the individual of a right and instead are focused on what
they can gain from their behavior (Kant, 1785). In the context of murder, a person who
plans and carries out someone’s murder may be more focused on how they may benefit
from committing the crime as opposed to the loss inflicted on the other person or their
family. If this is true, then it is unlikely that such a person could be deterred from
committing the crime. The murderer who cannot recognize the contradiction in depriving
someone of life is not likely to be swayed by the future prospect of facing consequences
for their actions.
Retribution. What is retribution? The Oxford English Dictionary (2016) defines
the word as “punishment for bad conduct, criminal actions, etc., typically considered in
terms of redress or repaying a debt to society; the avenging of wrong deeds, etc.”
Although the word itself is defined simply enough, the concept of retribution as a
justification for punishment, especially within the context of the death penalty, is far
more complex.
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Hegel supported capital punishment as a societal response to murder (Stillman,
1976). Hegel, however, also believed that every offender should be treated as a moral
being and with a degree of dignity (McTaggart, 1896). As such, Hegel viewed the
infliction of pain as the most effective means by which offenders should be punished and
that punishment, in order to be legitimate, must be carried out by other men (McTaggart,
1896). Hegel also viewed punishment as being a “right” that all men possess, a view
shared by other notable philosophers such as Kant and Frichte (Dubber, 1998). But pain,
according to Hegel, was a right that men possess because it is inherently good in
correcting anti-social behavior, which in a civilized society all men should want
(McTaggart, 1896). Pain by itself, however, will not correct criminal behavior. If pain in
the form of punishment is to be effective, Hegel believed that the individual or
individuals receiving the punishment must perceive that the person or persons inflicting
the punishment are legitimate and moral themselves (McTaggart, 1896). Without such
legitimacy, an offender is likely to view himself as a martyr and the infliction of pain is
then rendered ineffective (McTaggart, 1896). Hegel’s views on pain and punishment,
however, did not extend to all offenses. For instance, Hegel did not believe that the legal
system should punish offenses such as the infliction of emotional pain given that such
offenses do not deprive the victim of a tangible right (i.e. property right or personal
security) (Stillman, 1976).
Philosopher John Locke also espoused a retributive view of punishment (Calvert,
1993). Locke’s view of retributive punsihment, however, was arguably limited in the
sense that the only punishment that offenders deserve is a punishment that serves to
protect citizens’ rights (Tuckness, 2010). In fact, Locke would have rejected the idea of

20

any punishment that did not serve the greater good by preventing future crimes or by
helping victims, namely in the way of restitution, which may better serve to restore
harmony to society as opposed to strictly retribution (Tuckness, 2010). What were
Locke’s views on the death penalty?
According to Locke, criminals are “at war with society” and as such the
government retains the right to punish them (Calvert, 1993). Locke viewed the death
penalty as being reserved for a very small class of individuals; those who consciously and
willfully commit an unjustifiable homicide (Calvert, 1993). One could argue that the U.S.
Supreme Court has been on a continuous quest to reserve the death penalty for the
narrowest class of individuals possible ever since its decision in Gregg (428 U.S. 153).
The Court, for instance, struck down the death penalty for rape with its decisions in
Coker v. Georgia (433 U.S. 584, 1977) and Kennedy v. Louisiana (554 U.S 407, 2008). It
seems likely then that Locke would have viewed rape in the same way as the Justices in
the preceding cases. Locke would have viewed rape as a crime that does not justify the
death penalty given that the defendant has not taken the victim’s life in a literal sense.
Joel Feinberg takes an alternative stance on retribution. According to Feinberg,
punishment should not be administered to educate an offender (Feinberg, 1974). Further,
Feinberg posits that punishing the mentally ill and punishments based solely on
deterrence are counterproductive (Feinberg, 1974). Feinberg also does not support the
death penalty or any form of punishment that inflicts suffering (Feinberg, 1974). Notably,
Feinberg views life imprisonment as adequately severe (Feinberg, 1974).
The U.S. Supreme Court has, for many years, reinforced the idea that
punishments which result in unnecessary suffering are especially problematic. As early as
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the late 1880s with its ruling in In re Kemmler (136 U.S. 436, 1890), the Court
acknowledged the idea that “cruel and unusual” or “inhuman and barbarous” violate the
Eighth Amendment. More recently in Baze v. Rees (553 U.S. 35, 2008), Chief Justice
Roberts acknowledged that as less painful methods of execution become available, states
should consider transitioning to those methods; however, defendants must also make a
showing of more than a merely marginal reduction in pain if a constitutional violation is
to be found. Such a position, however, may be at odds with Feinberg’s view that
punishment should not inflict suffering or even Hegel’s view that criminals are to be
treated as moral beings. Justice Alito’s position that defendants have a responsibility to
find less painful alternatives, which he espoused in Glossip v. Gross (135 S. Ct. 2726,
2015), may be viewed by Feinberg and Hegel as missing the point. Feinberg would likely
take issue with the idea that defendants are responsible for diminishing their own pain
and suffering when a method of punishment arguably inflicts such suffering in the first
place. Hegel would likely be left wondering whether leaving the discovery of a less
painful alternative to the defendant constitutes treating the person as moral being with
dignity.
Many of the ideas espoused within these philosophical traditions have been
incorporated, in part, by the U.S. Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence. At the
same time, the Supreme Court has, from time to time deviated from many of these
principles. A closer examination of some of the Court’s opinions will show that there has
been both endorsement and rejection of these philosophical ideas at various times.
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The Jurisprudential History of the Death Penalty in the United States
It may be said that the development of the death penalty in the United States has
occurred in several phases. Arguably, the U.S. Supreme Court’s death penalty
jurisprudence can be divided into four eras: 1) pre-Furman era; 2) Furman/Gregg era; 3)
post-Gregg era; and 4) era of categorical exclusions. In the pages that follow, a discussion
of the major decisions that were handed down during these eras will be provided.
Importantly, this discussion will focus on the legal and philosophical rationales used by
the Justices to support their opinions.
Pre-Furman. The Constitutional basis for the use of the death penalty in the
United States has long been the subject of dispute (see Stinneford, 2014). As the legal
development of the death penalty in this country suggests, prior to Furman v. Georgia
(408 U.S. 238), the Court seemingly paid little attention to concerns about arbitrariness in
the death penalty and instead focused its efforts largely on the constitutionality of the
various methods of execution.
The first case from this period that reveals the nation’s attitude about punishment
is Wilkerson v. Utah (99 U.S. 130, 1878). In Wilkerson, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a
Utah statute permitting the use of public hanging, beheading and shooting as methods of
punishment for those convicted of murder. Twelve years after Wilkerson in In re
Kemmler (136 U.S. 436) the Court upheld the use of electrocution as a method of
punishment, further expanding the range of options available to sentencing bodies.
Perhaps the most important take away from Kemmler (136 U.S. 436), however, was the
revelation of how the Court viewed the concept of cruel and unusual punishment at the
time. Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Melville Fuller said,
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“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life” (Kemmler 136 U.S. at 447, Fuller, C.J., opinion).
One might surmise then, that Chief Justice Fuller viewed electrocution as a means of
ensuring instantaneous death for the defendant. Given this notion, it is not difficult to see
why Chief Justice Fuller stopped short of calling the death penalty cruel, even if it was, at
the time, unusual.
Whether discussing the methods of administering the death penalty or
administering punishment in general, the idea of proportionality in punishment did not
enjoy much legal relevance until 1910. There are, however, two exceptions which
illustrated the Court’s reluctance to incorporate the Eighth Amendment to the states.
First, in 1866 the Court decided Prevear v. Massachusetts (72 U.S. 475, 1866). Prevear
(72 U.S. 475) involved a defendant’s challenge to a $50 fine and a three-month period of
hard labor following his conviction for selling “intoxicating liquors.” The Court held that
the Eighth Amendment only applied to the federal government and not to the states. In
writing for a unanimous Court, Chief Justice Salmon Chase reasoned that the penalty
imposed was not unusual at the time given that most other states imposed similar
penalties for the same type of offense (Prevear, 72 U.S. 475). The Court added that if the
Eighth Amendment had applied to the states at the time, the penalty imposed would not
have violated the cruel and unusual provision of the Eighth Amendment (Prevear, 72
U.S. 475).
In O’Neil v. Vermont (144 U.S. 323, 1892), the Court also rejected a claim of
cruel and unusual punishment on the grounds that the Eighth Amendment to the
Constitution did not apply to the states. Like Prevear, this case involved the sale of
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intoxicating liquors. The trial court found O’Neil guilty of multiple offenses and
sentenced him to pay a fine of just over $6,600 and a period of hard labor in a house of
correction. However, in writing for the majority, Justice Samuel Blatchford implied that
the Amendment “likely” applied to the states even though it had yet to be incorporated
via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was a key development
in the sense that the door was left open to full incorporation of the Eighth Amendment at
a later time. Incorporation would permit defendants to bring Eighth Amendment claims
to federal court that would serve as an additional check to states’ discretion in imposing
punishments that are potentially cruel and unusual.
It was not until the Supreme Court decided Weems v. United States (217 U.S.
349, 1910) that the issue of proportionality came full circle. Although the Court’s ruling
in Weems did not address the idea of proportionality in the context of the death penalty,
this ruling represented the first occasion in which the Court relied on the cruel and
unusual provision of the Eighth Amendment to strike down an imposed punishment.
Weems, a Coast Guard officer, was convicted of defrauding the United States
government by falsifying an official document and received a fine of “4,000 pesetas” and
15 years imprisonment, a punishment he believed to be excessive considering the crime.
Writing for the majority, Justice Joseph McKenna said that “it is a precept of justice that
punishment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to offense” (Weems 217 U.S.
at 367). Justice McKenna went on to say that,
“What constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly decided. It has
been said that ordinarily the terms imply something inhuman and barbarous, torture and
the like…” (Weems 217 U.S. at 368, McKenna, J., opinion).
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To be sure, the Court’s ruling in Weems only dealt with proportionality in the
context of fines and periods of incarceration. The Weems ruling does not address other
methods of punishment such as various methods used to impose the death penalty.
Regarding electrocution, the Court held in Francis v. ex rel. Resweber (329 U.S.
459, 1947) that even in cases in which the first attempt at administering an execution
fails, a second attempt does not necessarily violate the Eighth Amendment. The state of
Louisiana convicted 16-year-old Willie Francis of murder and imposed a sentence of
death (Resweber, 329 U.S. 459). During Francis’ first execution attempt, an insufficient
amount of electrical current passed through his body to kill him (Resweber, 329 U.S.
459). The state then sought a second attempt, asserting a technical error in the equipment.
Francis argued that this second attempt constituted cruel and unusual punishment, in
violation of the Eighth Amendment (Resweber, 329 U.S. 459).
In rejecting Francis’ Eighth Amendment claim, the Court reasoned that the
amendment was intended to protect defendants from torture, not technical errors
committed by the state (Resweber, 329 U.S. 459). In writing for the Court, Justice
Stanley Reed argued that any prior psychological distress Resweber may have suffered in
preparing for and undergoing the first execution attempt was irrelevant (Resweber, 329
U.S. 459). Justice Reed was more concerned that each attempt did not wantonly inflict
any unnecessary suffering upon the defendant. If this were the case, the state could not be
said to have violated the Eighth Amendment simply by attempting the execution a second
time (Resweber, 329 U.S. 459). To further illustrate his point, Justice Reed stated that:
“The situation of the unfortunate victim of this accident is just as though he had suffered
the identical amount of mental anguish and physical pain in any other occurrence, such
as, for example, a fire in the cell block.” (Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464, Reed, J., opinion).
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Even if one agrees with Justice Reed’s reasoning, Justice Felix Frankfurter’s
concurrence provides an interesting glimpse into the very human side of constitutional
litigation. His views may be summed up as follows:
“Strongly drawn as I am to some of the sentiments expressed by my brother BURTON, I
cannot rid myself of the conviction that were I to hold that Louisiana would transgress
the Due Process Clause if the State were allowed, in the precise circumstances before us,
to carry out the death sentence, I would be enforcing my private view rather than that
consensus of society's opinion which, for purposes of due process, is the standard
enjoined by the Constitution” (Resweber 329 U.S. at 471, Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Justice Frankfurter recognized the weight of two countervailing principles; recognition of
the heinous nature of what the condemned are forced to endure and recognition that the
Constitution holds states blameless for unintentional mistakes. In his dissent, Justice
Harold Burton echoed the concerns of Justice Frankfurter. In a strongly worded opinion,
Justice Burton stated,
“Taking human life by unnecessarily cruel means shocks the most fundamental instincts
of civilized man. It should not be possible under the constitutional procedure of a selfgoverning people. Abhorrence of the cruelty of ancient forms of capital punishment has
increased steadily until, today, some states have prohibited capital punishment
altogether...” (Resweber, 329 U.S. at 473-4, Burton, J., dissenting).
Prior to 1958, no court had formally acknowledged that within the context of
punishment, attitudes about the methods of punishment may be different at different
times depending on changing societal values. The Supreme Court’s decision in Trop v.
Dulles (356 U.S. 86, 1958) represented a sea change in terms of how the Court would
come to address both Eighth Amendment claims generally and death penalty challenges
specifically. Although not a death penalty case, the ruling in Trop introduces the concept
of “evolving standards of decency.” Trop stems from an incident that occurred in 1944 in
which Albert Trop, who was being confined at a military stockade in Casablanca,
Morocco for a disciplinary violation, escaped from custody. Officials picked up Trop the
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next day; although he asserted that he was willingly returning to the stockade.
Nonetheless, a court martial found him guilty of military desertion and among other
things, dishonorably discharged him from the military. Eight years later, Trop’s
application for a passport was denied on the grounds that he had forfeited his U.S.
citizenship under Section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, stemming from his
conviction and dishonorable discharge. Upon hearing Trop’s challenge regarding his loss
of citizenship under Section 401(g), the Court concluded that the deprivations imposed
by the loss of citizenship as a punishment were unacceptably cruel and unusual (Trop,
356 U.S. 86). More importantly, Chief Justice Earl Warren summed up the Eighth
Amendment in the following manner,
“…The words of the Amendment are not precise, and their scope is not static. The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society” (Trop 356 U.S. at 100-1, Warren, C.J., opinion).
Chief Justice Warren’s opinion provides us with the roots of evolving standards of
decency, a principle that would substantially inform how the Court would later address
claims of cruel and unusual punishment. The principles embedded in evolving standards
of decency dictate that punishment for any crime must comport with current societal
values. Evolving standards of decency is a fluid concept that changes as society
progresses. This concept would become vitally important in the years and decades to
follow.
Furman and Gregg. Prior to 1972, American criminal courts imposed the death
penalty with little regard to the process by which it was carried out. Except for the
Kemmler (136 U.S. 436) and Resweber (329 U.S. 459) rulings, the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed issues surrounding the method and mode of execution only sporadically.
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One exception to this seeming lack of concern for the death penalty process was
the Court’s ruling in Witherspoon v. Illinois (391 U.S. 510, 1968). In Witherspoon, the
Court ruled that the state of Illinois erred in permitting the exclusion of people from
juries who possess “conscientious scruples.” The Court determined that this violated both
the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an impartial jury as well as the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such practices, the Court reasoned, would have the effect
of creating juries that would be overly biased in favor of imposing a death sentence and
therefore not impartial, as the Constitution requires (Witherspoon, 391 U.S. 510).
Ultimately, Witherspoon overturned what had been a long-accepted practice of
challenging jurors who possesed conscientious scruples against imposing the death
penalty (see Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 1892). Several years after
Witherspoon in Wainwright v. Witt (469 U.S. 412, 1985), the Court clarified the standard
to be used when determining whether a prospective juror could be excluded from a death
penalty case based on their beliefs about capital punishment. In its ruling, the Court
determined that jurors could be excluded if their bias against the death penalty would
totally prevent or significantly hinder a prospective juror’s ability to evaluate the
punishment on its merits or abide by the jury’s instructions (Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412).
Another exception to the seeming disinterest in death penalty procedure came in
the Court’s decision in McGautha v. California (402 U.S. 183, 1971). McGautha
involved two separate challenges from defendants in California and Ohio. In each case,
the juries responsible for determining guilt and punishment enjoyed virtually unfettered
discretion in reaching their decision on the issues. In the Ohio case, the jury determined
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both guilt and punishment in a single phase (McGautha, 402 U.S. 183). The Justices in
McGautha found no constitutional error when death penalty defendants were convicted
and sentenced in a single phase. Writing for the Court, Justice John Harlan seems to
advocate a hands-off approach when dealing with this aspect of the process (i.e. unitary
versus bifucated proceedings). Instead, Justice Harlan was content to leave this
determination to the states given that the Court’s role was simply to determine whether a
unitary proceeding was unconstitutional (McGautha, 402 U.S. 183). The Court’s ruling in
McGautha would partially frame the discussion about arbitrariness in the imposition of
the death penalty by opening a discussion about the lack of due process that may be
present when guilt and sentencing are conducted in a single phase.
The Court’s approach to analyzing the death penalty changed with the Furman
(408 U.S. 238) decision in 1972. Furman (408 U.S. 238) served as the impetus for what
would be a de facto moratorium on the death penalty. This case, which together with
Jackson v. Georgia and Branch v. Texas, involved a homicide committed during the
commission of a home burglary (Furman, 408 U.S. 238). Following Furman’s
conviction, the Court was tasked with determining whether the death penalty itself was a
constitutional form of punishment for rape and murder. With only a plurality, the Justices
took full advantage of the opportunity to espouse a wide range of views about the death
penalty11. Justice William Brennan believed that the death penalty, especially when
arbitrarily imposed, deprived the convicted person of his or her dignity (directly in line
with Hegel’s view that all offenders deserve to be treated with dignity). In his concurring

11 There

was no agreement among the justices in the plurality about the reasons for which
the death penalty should be invalidated, only that the death penalty, as administered at the
time, was unconstitutional.
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opinion, Justice Brennan argued that the death penalty is the most extreme form of
punishment and addressed the issue of arbitrariness,
“When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is
legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted
arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system…” (Furman 408 U.S. at
293, Brennan, J., concurring).
Justice Brennan was not alone in his antipathy for the death penalty. Justice
Thurgood Marshall shared this belief and delineated his views in a separate concurring
opinion. Parts of Justice Marshall’s opinion would form the basis of the Marshall
Hypothesis. Specifically, Justice Marshall lays out the argument that the American
people are, by and large, misinformed about the death penalty and that being more
informed about the death penalty would make them less likely to favor it. The exception
to this rule, however, applies to people who favor the death penalty for retributive
reasons, in which case increased knowledge of the death penalty will have no impact on
peoples’ opinion of the practice12. In his concurrence, Justice Marshall stated,
“…whether or not a punishment is cruel and unusual depends, not on whether its mere
mention "shocks the conscience and sense of justice of the people," but on whether
people who were fully informed as to the purposes of the penalty and its liabilities would
find the penalty shocking, unjust, and unacceptable. In other words, the question with
which we must deal is not whether a substantial proportion of American citizens would
today, if polled, opine that capital punishment is barbarously cruel, but whether they
would find it to be so in the light of all information presently available. This is not to
suggest that with respect to this test of unconstitutionality people are required to act
rationally; they are not. With respect to this judgment, a violation of the Eighth
Amendment is totally dependent on the predictable subjective, emotional reactions of
informed citizens.” (Furman 408 U.S. at 361-62, Marshall, J., concurring).
To further illustrate his point, Justice Marshall explained,
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For recent tests of the Marshall Hypothesis, see Cochran, J. K. & Chamblin, M. B.
(2005); Cochran, J. K., Sanders, B. & Chamblin, M. B. (2006) and Lee, G., Bohm, R. &
Pazzani, L. (2014).
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“It has often been noted that American citizens know almost nothing about capital
punishment. Some of the conclusions arrived at in the preceding section and the
supporting evidence would be critical to an informed judgment on the morality of the
death penalty: e. g., that the death penalty is no more effective a deterrent than life
imprisonment, that convicted murderers are rarely executed, but are usually sentenced to
a term in prison; that convicted murderers usually are model prisoners, and that they
almost always become law abiding citizens upon their release from prison; that the costs
of executing a capital offender exceed the costs of imprisoning him for life; that while in
prison, a convict under sentence of death performs none of the useful functions that life
prisoners perform; that no attempt is made in the sentencing process to ferret out likely
recidivists for execution; and that the death penalty may actually stimulate criminal
activity” (Furman 408 U.S. at 362-363, Marshall, J., concurring).
Contemporarily, this may go a long way in explaining why death penalty support
continues to decline given that roughly 6 in 10 Americans do not believe in the deterrent
effect of the death penalty (Dutton et al., 2015).
Despite the apparent support among some Justices for ending the death penalty,
this support was not universal. Justice Douglas expressed concerns about arbitrariness
and disproportionality in sentencing but only opined that the death penalty violated the
Eighth Amendment at the time, and not in general (Furman, 408 U.S. 238). In his
concurrence, Justice Douglas noted that,
“…we deal with a system of law and of justice that leaves to the uncontrolled discretion
of judges or juries the determination whether defendants committing these crimes should
die or be imprisoned. Under these laws no standards govern the selection of the penalty.
People live or die, dependent on the whim of one man or of 12.” (Furman 408 U.S. at
253, Douglas, J., concurring).
Implicit in his words is the notion that Justice Douglas believes in the value of the death
penalty itself but that the process is problematic. Justice Douglas likely did not intend to
suggest that such standards would guarantee the elimination of an arbitrary death penalty,
but he did seem optimistic that a predictable process would help ensure fairness in
imposing a sentence that is otherwise constitutional.
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Moreover, Justices Stewart and White agreed that the arbitrary nature of the death
penalty was troubling but neither Justice saw any need to rule on the constitutionality of
the death penalty itself (Furman, 408 U.S. 238). That is not to say, however, that Justice
Stewart did not share the same disdain for arbitrariness in the death penalty as some of
his colleagues. Justice Stewart summed up his views by stating, “These death sentences
are cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual”
(Furman 408 U.S. at 309). Justice Stewart, however, was only referring to the specific
death sentences at issue in Furman. As discussed later, a reading of his opinion in Gregg
v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153) four years later suggests that Justice Stewart’s concerns about
arbitrariness seemed to diminish.
In the end, the Court’s decision in Furman coincided with a four-year death
penalty moratorium while state legislatures revisited and refined their death penalty
statutes13. Although the goal of such revisions was for states to create more predictable,
systematic ways to impose the death penalty, the Court provided no guidance on what
new guidelines should look like. This lack of guidance ultimately resulted in the Supreme
Court revisiting the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153).
In Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the death
penalty in and of itself does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Gregg (428
U.S. 153) stems from Gregg’s challenge to his death sentence following convictions for
robbery and murder. Ultimately, Gregg’s death sentence for the robbery conviction was
reduced. However, Gregg challenged his death sentence for the murder conviction
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Florida was the first state to revisit its death penalty statute, followed by 34 other states
(“Reinstatement of the Death Penalty.” Findlaw, 2016).
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(Gregg, 428 U.S. 153). Writing for the Court, Justice Stewart noted that “It is apparent
from the text of the Constitution itself that the existence of capital punishment was
accepted by the Framers” (Gregg, 428 U.S. at 177). Moreover, “the death penalty is said
to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by
prospective offenders” (Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183). The Court reiterated, however, that the
death penalty must be reserved for only the most extreme cases (Gregg, 428 U.S. 153). In
this case, the Court upheld Georgia’s death penalty statute (Gregg, 428 U.S. 153).
Justice Stewart discussed the necessity of limiting the death penalty in noting that,
“…where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the
determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious
action” (Gregg 428 U.S. at 189, Stewart, J., opinion).
Justice Stewart’s concerns about arbitrariness seemed to wane significantly as a result of
the new processes for imposing the death penalty, namely, the recommendation that
states use a bifurcated proceeding (treating the guilt and sentencing phases as two
independent processes). This represents a significant shift in approach from the unitary
proceeding previously upheld in McGautha (402 U.S.183). The most likely explanation
for this shift may be an underlying propensity of juries who convict a defendant of
murder to also impose the death penalty, which may create a system that is inherently
biased in favor of imposing the death penalty for too wide a range of first-degree
murderers. In order to ensure that the death penalty is reserved for the narrowest class of
individuals, it is beneficial to allow a newly drawn jury to consider aggravating and
mitigating factors without the burden of determining guilt or innocence first.
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In addition, Georgia’s capital sentencing bodies now had to rely on information
about the defendant, the nature of the crime and analyses of other, similar death-eligible
cases (Gregg, 428 U.S. 153). On this point Justice Stewart noted,
“While standards to guide a capital jury's sentencing deliberations are by necessity
somewhat general, they do provide guidance to the sentencing authority and thereby
reduce the likelihood that it will impose a sentence that fairly can be called capricious or
arbitrary. Where the sentencing authority is required to specify the factors it relied upon
in reaching its decision, the further safeguard of meaningful appellate review is available
to ensure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner”
(Gregg 428 U.S. at 193-195, Stewart, J., opinion).
Interestingly, although recognizing the importance of analyzing other, similar deatheligible cases, the Supreme Court would later rule that analyses of other death-eligible
cases in the sentencing process are not constitutionally required (Pulley v. Harris, 465
U.S. 37, 1984). The question, however, is that without such analyses, can meaningful
appellate review as envisioned by Justice Stewart occur? The answer to this question may
rest on the effectiveness of other measures such as bifurcated proceedings and the extent
to which sentencing juries consider aggravating and mitigating factors.
Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion in Gregg reiterated the importance of the
Marshall Hypothesis and argued that even while 35 states had revised their death penalty
statutes following Furman, the American public remained largely uninformed about the
death penalty14. In addition, Justice Marshall took issue with an empirical study that was
published following the Court’s decision in Furman which showed that the death penalty
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Justice Marshall cites the following in support of the claim that the American public
remained largely ill-informed about the death penalty: Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion,
The Death Penlaty, and the Eighth Amendment: Testing the Marshall Hypothesis, 1976
Wis. L. Rev. 171.
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is an effective deterrent to murder15. In any event, while the Gregg decision was a
significant step toward ensuring a fairer process, this decision did not stop defendants
from bringing additional, more nuanced challenges to states’ death penalty procedures.
Post-Gregg Challenges to Sentencing Schemes. Following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s decision in Gregg, states were required to develop systematic methods for
reducing arbitrariness in the death penalty. Although several states attempted to comply
with the Court’s demands, their solutions were still subject to numerous constitutional
challenges.
For example, several plaintiffs raised challenges to the constitutionality of the
death penalty itself. The first such challenge came in Jurek v. Texas (428 U.S. 262,
1976), where a petitioner challenged Texas’ new death penalty statute following his
conviction and death sentence, asserting that the Texas statute would simply lead to the
arbitrary imposition of the death penalty (Jurek, 428 U.S. 262). The Court reiterated its
holding in Gregg that the death penalty itself is not cruel and unusual and further ruled
that states must consider more than just aggravating factors for the death penalty to be
properly imposed. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, observed that “In order to
meet the requirements of U.S. Const. amends. VIII, XIV, a capital-sentencing system has
to allow the sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances” (Jurek, 428 U.S.
at 271). In a related case decided on the same day, Profitt v. Florida (428 U.S. 242, 1976),
the Court further opined that the death penalty is not in and of itself unconstitutional. The
Court further upheld the practice of the judge serving as the sole sentencing authority, a
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See Ehrlich, I. The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and
Death, 65 Am. Econ. Rev. 397 (June 1975).
36

practice that would eventually be revisited in McGautha v. California (Proffitt, 428 U.S.
242)16.
The state of North Carolina implemented procedures that would have required the
death penalty for all defendants convicted of first-degree murder in a totally nondiscretionary manner (i.e. without the consideration of mitigating factors). The Court,
however, reasoned that such a scheme went too far. In Woodson v. North Carolina (428
U.S. 280, 1976), Justice Potter Stewart observed that public opinion generally did not
support the mandatory imposition of the death penalty, even in cases of first-degree
murder. Further, the Court reasoned that any mechanism that did not allow for the
consideration of mitigating factors makes it impossible for juries to truly separate the
worst of the worst from others who may be less culpable (Woodson, 428 U.S. 280). The
Court reiterated the importance of mitigating factors in Roberts v. Louisiana (428 U.S.
325, 1976), where it struck down a Louisiana sentencing scheme that required the death
penalty for certain classes of homicide without the need to consider mitigating factors.
The Court further rejected the practice of instructing juries to consider lesser charges in
the absence of evidence to support those lesser charges (Roberts, 428 U.S. 325). The
danger with such a practice, the Court noted, was that jurors who do not favor the death
penalty may choose to convict on the lesser charges based on this belief, creating a
system that is inherently biased against the death penalty (Roberts, 428 U.S. 325). Thus,
even to narrow the class of death-eligible defendants, the Court recognized that a
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The Supreme Court deemed Florida’s capital sentencing scheme to be unconstitutional
in 2016 given that the state did not require a jury to unanimously impose death sentences
(see Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S.__, 2016).
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balancing act is required. Juries must fall somewhere in the middle of being too heavily
in favor of the death penalty while not being too opposed to the practice.
During this era, the U.S. Supreme Court also determined that limiting the number
of mitigating factors a jury may consider violates the Eighth Amendment. In Lockett v.
Ohio (438 U.S. 538), the Court expanded on its ruling in Woodson by specifying that all
mitigating factors related to the defendant or the offense must be considered before a
death sentence may be fairly imposed. The Woodson decision stemmed from a North
Carolina statute that required all persons convicted of first-degree murder in the state to
be automatically sentenced to death. The Court, however, determined that such a practice
violated the Eighth Amendment and that some mitigating factors must be considered in
sentencing decisions. The ruling in Lockett further illustrates the point that the Court
views the death penalty only as a last resort. The requirement that all possible mitigating
factors be considered before sentencing a convicted person to death is clearly intended as
a significant hurdle that makes death sentences much harder to impose relative to other
sanctions. The Court reiterated this point in Eddings v. Oklahoma (455 U.S. 104, 1982),
which involved a teenage boy convicted of a murder he committed at age 16. In imposing
his death sentence, the trial court limited its consideration of mitigating factors to only
the boy’s youth. The Court rejected this practice and, affirming its stance in Lockett,
ruled that all mitigating factors (in this case an abusive family history and emotional
disturbance) must be considered (Eddings, 455 U.S. 104). In sum, the Court firmly
established the importance of mitigating factors in the years following its decision in
Gregg. Mitigating factors serve two primary purposes. First, mitigating factors work to
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narrow the class of death-eligible defendants. Second, mitigating factors help to ensure
that defendants are not mistakenly sentenced to death.
Even when individual statutory aggravating factors have been ruled
unconstitutional, the Court has held that death sentences imposed under the statute may
still be valid. In Zant v. Stevens (462 U.S. 862, 1983), for example, the Court upheld a
defendant’s conviction and death sentence after the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit overruled the use of one of Georgia’s three statutory aggravating factors
(Zant, 462 U.S. 862). In Zant, the majority sought to distinguish this case from the
Court’s ruling in Stromberg v. California (283 U.S 359, 1931). In Stromberg, the Court
determined that when a jury is provided with two or more independent rationales for
imposing a guilty verdict and told that it may rely on any of those rationales, that verdict
must be vacated if at least one of those rationales is found to be unconstitutional. The
ruling in Zant is distinct in that the state of Georgia required only one aggravating factor
to be present to support the imposition of a death sentence. The fact that one of the three
aggravating factors was found to be invalid was determined to be irrelevant since there
was no chance that this factor was used to determine whether Stevens would be sentenced
to death (Zant, 462 U.S. 862). Further, Justice Stevens discussed how the finding of one
statutory aggravating factor does not necessarily guarantee that the death penalty will be
imposed. There is still a process by which sentencing juries have great discretion in
determining who will be sentenced to death, thereby serving as an additional measure for
narrowing the class of death-eligible defendants. Sentencing juries can do this by
examining all factors presented during the sentencing phase and not just the presence of
one aggravating factor (Zant, 462 U.S. 862).
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Prosecutorial framing of the jury’s role and the legal process has also been
grounds for challenging a death sentence. In Caldwell v. Mississippi (472 U.S. 320,
1985), the Court struck down a death sentence on the grounds that prosecutors had
mislead the jury during closing arguments at trial regarding the amount of responsibility
vested upon them as jurors. Namely, the prosecutor in Caldwell’s trial informed the jury
to view their deliberations as not necessarily being the final determining factor of
whether Caldwell would die, and that the Mississippi Supreme Court would ultimately
make that determination on appeal (Caldwell, 472 U.S. 320, 1985). This was problematic
because it effectively allowed the jury, at least in theory, to pass the buck to the
Mississippi Supreme Court. However, there was no guarantee that the Mississippi
Supreme Court would have the final say in determining Caldwell’s fate given the many
appeals that often occur throughout the death penalty process. Thus, such instructions
from the prosecutor were disingenuous to say the least.
Also key in the discussion of the constitutionality of the death penalty is the issue
of racial disparities. One Supreme Court decision prominent in the discussion of racial
disparities and the death penalty is McCleskey v. Kemp (481 U.S. 279, 1987). McCleskey
centers on a black defendant who was convicted of murdering a white police officer.
McCleskey subsequently challenged his death sentence on the grounds that his sentence
was racially motivated. To support his claim, McCleskey presented what is now widely
known as the Baldus Study; showing that black defendants who kill white victims in the
state of Georgia were more likely than any other group to receive the death penalty (see
Baldus, Pulaski and Woodworth, 1983). In writing for a narrow 5-4 majority, Justice
Lewis Powell rejected the use of an empirical study as evidence that McCleskey’s
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specific death sentence was racially motivated (McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279). Justice Powell
noted that every death penalty case presents its own set of issues that must be weighed by
the sentencing body in order to determine whether someone will receive the death penalty
(McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279). Questions of whether racial disparities in imposing the death
penalty exist, Justice Powell noted, are better suited for legislative bodies and not the
courts (McCleskey, 481 U.S. 279)17.
Finally, the Court has determined that defendants convicted of rape cannot be
executed. Immediately following Gregg, the Court overruled the practice of executing
defendants convicted of raping adult women (Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584). The
Coker decision illustrates the Court’s conception of evolving standards of decency. At the
time, Georgia was the only state that permitted the death penalty for the rape of an adult
woman. In his majority opinion, Justice Byron White discussed the finality of the death
penalty juxtaposed against the crime of rape which, although severe, does not deprive
someone of life, at least not in a literal sense. He observed that,
“The death penalty, which is unique in its severity and irrevocability, is an excessive
penalty for the rapist who does not take human life” (Coker, 433 U.S. at 598, White, J.,
opinion).
Further, in 2008, the Court effectively eliminated the death penalty in all cases of
rape. In Kennedy v. Louisiana (554 U.S. 407), the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute
permitting the death penalty for defendants convicted of raping a child under the age of
12. The Court again relied on proportionality in reasoning that in cases of rape, even the
rape of a child, the death penalty is excessive (Kennedy, 554 U.S. 407). The Court also
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Also key in this decision was the notion that defendants must demonstrate that sentence
makers acted in a discriminatory fashion in their particular case, a standard that was not
met in McCleskey (McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279).
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relied on national consensus as a measure of evolving standards of decency in its ruling
in Kennedy. Specifically, although 5 other states had statutes like Louisiana’s at the time,
the Court determined that this did not rise to the level of a national consensus supporting
the death penalty in such cases.
“After reviewing the authorities informed by contemporary norms, including the history
of the death penalty for the crime of child rape and other non-homicide crimes, current
state statutes and new enactments, and the number of executions since 1964, the United
States Supreme Court concludes there is a national consensus against capital punishment
for the crime of child rape” (Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 434, Kennedy, J., opinion).

Categorical Exclusions. The Court’s jurisprudence on categorical exclusions or
defendants who do not have the same criminal culpability as other defendants dates to the
pre-Furman years. For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that certain classes of
defendants such as addicts (i.e. addicted to narcotics) cannot be prosecuted merely
because of their status (Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 1962). To punish drug
addicts for simply being drug addicts amounts to cruel and unusual punishment
(Robinson, 370 U.S. 660). Six years later in Powell v. Texas (392 U.S. 514, 1968), the
Court considered whether alcoholics should be included among the group of defendants
who should be exempt from criminal punishment because of their status. In Powell, the
Court distinguished between alcoholism as a status and public intoxication as a crime.
Writing for the plurality, Justice Marshall rejected petitioner’s argument that he was
unable to control his alcohol consumption. Even if Powell could have demonstrated that
he was not in control of his consumption, Justice Marshall argued that the law still would
not protect him from prosecution for being drunk in public (Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S.
514). This is especially true given the lack of a nexus between one’s status as an
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alcoholic and whether someone can control themselves from going into public while
intoxicated (Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514).
Drug addicts and alcoholics, however, are not the groups of individuals for whom
proportionality in punishment, especially where the death penalty is concerned, has been
questioned. There are three special classes of defendants that are exempt from the death
penalty: 1) the insane; 2) juveniles; and 3) the intellectually impaired (formerly referred
to as the mentally retarded). It is important to note that regarding each of these groups,
the Court has not always been willing to automatically grant such protections, a point
explained further below.
Regarding defendants of diminished mental capacity, the U.S. Supreme Court has
taken many years to develop a coherent and meaningful jurisprudence with regard to
punishment. In Buck v. Bell (274 U.S. 200, 1927) for instance, the Court determined that
no due process violation occurred when the state of Virginia imposed forced sterilization
on defendant Carrie Buck. Writing for the Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
defended the practice inasmuch as forced sterilization would prevent the propogation of
future generations of feeble-minded people (Buck, 274 U.S. 200). Given that Virginia’s
law addressed merely a medical procedure that could not be imposed without some due
process, the Court upheld the the practice (Buck, 274 U.S. 200).
Although Justice Holmes’s position in this case may strike us today as insensitive,
ideas about the link between feeble-mindedness and genetics were not new at the time he
drafted his opinion in Buck. In his breakthrough research, Henry Goddard (1912) details
the story of Martin Kallikak and the two sides of the Kallikak family. Martin Kallikak
was said to have fathered children with two different women, one of “feeble-mindedness”
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and another Quaker woman with a good family background (Goddard, 1912). It is said
that the future generations of the feeble-minded woman went on to be characterized by
mental deficiencies and a host of medical and social problems (Goddard, 1912). The
future generations of the Quaker woman went on to be among the best society had to
offer (Goddard, 1912). The only logical explanation then, was that the differences in
people’s behavior and well-being were strictly genetic (Goddard, 1912).
Years after the decision in Buck (274 U.S. 200), the Court began changing its
stance regarding punishment and mental illness. In Ford v. Wainwright (477 U.S. 399,
1986), the Court determined that even for those defendants who were of sufficient mental
capacity to understand their crime at the time they committed it, executing defendants
who are deemed insane and cannot fully understand or appreciate their punishment
violates the cruel and unusual provision of the Eighth Amendment.
Writing for the majority, Justice Marshall draws upon common law tradition and
constructs a moral argument against the practice of executing the insane. Specifically,
Justice Marshall argues that there is a long tradition that suggests executing the insane is
simply offensive to humanity18, violates religious norms19, lacks a true deterrent value
and serves no retributive purpose20 (Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399). Justice Marshall
goes on to say that regarding executing the insane, these longstanding justifications
against the practice no doubt have a place in American jurisprudence. Specifically,
Justice Marshall stated:
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See Sir Edward Coke, 3 Institutes 6 (6th ed. 1680).
See Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 How. St. Tr. 474, 477
(1685).
20
See Hazard & Louisell, Death, the State, and the Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L.
Rev. 381, 387 (1962).
19
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“This ancestral legacy has not outlived its time. Today, no State in the Union permits the
execution of the insane. It is clear that the ancient and humane limitation upon the State's
ability to execute its sentences has as firm a hold upon the jurisprudence of today as it
had centuries ago in England. The various reasons put forth in support of the commonlaw restriction have no less logical, moral, and practical force than they did when first
voiced. For today, no less than before, we may seriously question the retributive value of
executing a person who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and
stripped of his fundamental right to life.” (Ford, 477 U.S. at 408-9, Marshall, J., opinion).
Ultimately, the ruling in Ford represents a dramatic shift from historical
conceptions of insanity. Foucault (1961), for instance, wrote extensively about the
meaning of insanity, particularly about how society has viewed the matter over time.
Foucault (1961) describes insanity as shifting from being highly visible in society to a
time when locking away the insane was more acceptable as a means of protecting society.
The overarching assumption during the Renaissance period and even into the
Enlightenment period was that people who were insane could only be cured by strict
discipline and physical control (Foucault, 1961). Society viewed those who were insane
as animals who were not subject to the same dignified treatment as normal humans
(Foucault, 1961). Today, it seems that the insane are treated in a less animalistic fashion
and truly deserving of leniency.
The U.S. Supreme Court has also subsumed juveniles within the ambit of groups
that should be categorically excluded from the death penalty. However, these protections
are of recent vintage (Streib, 2004). Although the Court would eventually determine that
executing juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment, arguments in favor of this practice
increasingly focused on the rising levels of violent juvenile crime, public fear of so-called
“super predators” and policy makers’ desire to get tough on violent juvenile crime
(Streib, 2004). Nonetheless, the process of excluding juveniles from the death penalty
began with the Court’s ruling in Thompson v. Oklahoma (487 U.S. 815, 1988), where the
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Court determined that executing defendants who committed murder before the age of 16
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Relying on evolving standards of decency,
Justice Stevens drew upon several factors to support his opinion. First, at the time, 18
states had set a minimum age threshhold for executions and each of them had forbidden
the execution of anyone under the age of 16 at the time of their offense (Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815). Second, Justice Stevens cited evidence of a decline in the
practice, noting that between 1982 and 1986, only 5 of the nearly 1,400 persons
sentenced to death for homicide were under the age of 16 (Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815). Finally, Justice Stevens discussed at length the idea that juveniles, in many
ways, have reduced culpability compared to adults who committ the same offense
(Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815).
Although the Court seemed to resolve this issue as it related to defendants under
the age of 16, it remained unclear whether defendants who were either 16 or 17 at the
time of their crime would be eligible for the death penalty. After originally upholding the
practice of executing minors in Stanford v. Kentucky (462 U.S. 361, 1989), the Court
reached a different conclusion in Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 551, 2005). The Roper
decision had its origins with 17-year-old Christopher Simmons who was sentenced to
death in 1993. The issue in this case centered on the Missouri Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Court’s ruling in Stanford v. Kentucky (462 U.S. 361). The U.S.
Supreme Court overturned Simmons’ conviction on the grounds that national consensus
no longer supported the execution of juvenile offenders (see State of Missouri v.
Christopher Simmons, 944 S.W.2d 165). Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy, drawing
again on national consensus against the practice of executing juveniles stated simply,
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“A majority of states have rejected the imposition of the death penalty on juvenile
offenders under 18, and the United States Supreme Court holds this is required by
the Eighth Amendment” (Roper, 543 U.S. at 568, Kennedy, J., opinion).
In addition, Justice Kennedy presented an argument centered on the lack of both deterrent
and retributive value in executing persons under the age of 18 (Roper, 543 U.S. 551).
Justice Kennedy framed the difference in culpability between youthful offenders and
adults in terms of youths’ immature behavior as they struggle to find their identity
(Roper, 543 U.S. 551). Given that the death penalty should be reserved for the worst
crimes committed by a narrow class of the most culpable defendants, juveniles should be
excluded under the Eighth Amendment as they have not fully matured or developed a
true sense of self (Roper, 543 U.S. 551). Justice Kennedy further recognized the
importance of international opinion, which had largely rejected the practice of executing
juveniles (Roper, 543 U.S. 551).
Prior to the decision in Roper, Streib (2004) noted many arguments against the
practice of executing juveniles. For instance, violent juvenile offenders most often come
from disadvantaged backgrounds and have not had an opportunity to “age out” of the
effects of having a poor childhood (Streib, 2004). Further, the medical and scientific
evidence suggests that brain development is still ongoing until a person’s late teen years
and even into their twenties (Streib, 2004). Echoing Justice Kennedy’s concerns
regarding the lack of a deterrent value in executing juveniles, Streib (2004) noted that
juveniles do not have a fully developed concept of death and, seeing themselves as
immortal, are not likely to factor death in to any cost-benefit analysis prior to committing
pre-meditated murder. Streib (2004) also acknowledges the lack of retributive value in
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the practice given the age of the offender and the prospect of punishing a child in the
most severe manner.
Finally, the Court has addressed the practice of executing mentally retarded
defendants (now referred to as intellectually deficient). The Court first addressed this
class of defendants in Penry v Lynaugh (492 U.S. 302, 1989). In Penry, the Court
addressed two key points. The first centered on jury instructions; specifically, whether
juries must be informed of a defendant’s mental capacity before considering it as a
mitigating factor. Second, the Court addressed whether executing defendants who are
intellectually deficient violates the Eighth Amendment. Although the majority
acknowledged that juries must be instructed on a defendant’s mental capacity, the
Justices rejected the notion that executing intellectually deficient defendants violates the
Eighth Amendment (Penry, 492 U.S. 302). The Court explained that “In light of the
diverse capacities and life experiences of mentally retarded persons, it cannot be said that
all mentally retarded people, by definition, can never act with the level of culpability
associated with the death penalty” (Penry, 492 U.S. at 338-339). Writing for the majority
in Penry, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor draws upon evolving standards of decency and
specifically state legislative enactments as a determinant of national consensus in favor of
or against a practice (Penry, 492 U.S. 302). At the time, only 2 states had either
prohibited or were in the process of prohibiting the execution of intellectually deficient
defendants (Penry, 492 U.S. 302). Justice O’Connor contrasts this figure from the
previous decision in Ford noting that at the time, no state permitted the execution of the
insane, constituting a national consensus against this practice (Penry, 492 U.S. 302).
Regarding public opinion as a determinant of evolving standards of decency, Justice
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O’Connor seems to downplay its importance unless such opinion leads to legislative
enactments rejecting certain practices. Even though the public overwhelmingly rejected
the practice of executing the intellectually deficient at the time of Penry, Justice
O’Connor still relied entirely on state legislative enactments, which she believed to be the
most objective measure of evolving standards of decency (Penry, 492 U.S. 302).
In 2002, however, the Court overturned its decision in Penry, ruling that
executing intellectually deficient defendants serves neither a deterrent nor a retributive
purpose and pointed out that many states had stopped executing intellectually deficient
defendants altogether since Penry (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 2002). Following
Daryl Atkins’ murder conviction, the defense brought forth just one forensic psychologist
who testified that Atkins was mildly intellectually deficient (Atkins, 536 U.S. 304).
Ultimately, the Virgina Supreme Court cited Penry in affirming Atkins’ death sentence.
Writing for the majority in Atkins, Justice Stevens noted that,
“Retribution and deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders are the social
purposes served by the death penalty. Unless the imposition of the death penalty on a
mentally retarded person measurably contributes to one or both of these goals, it is
nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering, and
hence an unconstitutional punishment” (Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319, Stevens, J., opinion).
Justice Stevens expanded on Justice O’Connor’s conception of evolving standards of
decency previously outlined in Penry. Both Justices agree that state legislative
enactments are an important consideration. However, Justice Stevens saw relatively little
importance in the raw number of state legislative enactments invalidating a practice and
instead focused on the upward trend of such enactments (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304). Justice Stevens noted that the decision in Penry served as an important impetus for
states to begin reconsidering the practice of executing intellectually deficient defendants
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(Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304). In the years leading up to the Atkins decision, 17
additional states had banned this practice with two other states, one of which was
Virginia, in the process of doing so (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304). Notably, Justices
Stevens and O’Connor disagreed on how much culpability should attach to intellectually
deficient defendants. While both Justices agreed that this class of defendants should be
somewhat culpable, Justice Stevens rejected the idea that some penological purpose is
served by executing them (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 2002).
In dissent, Justice Antonin Scalia criticized the majority’s conception of national
consensus and rejected the idea that executing all intellectually deficient defendants
violates the Eighth Amendment (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 2002). Specifically,
Justice Scalia disagreed with the idea that 47% of the states that permitted the death
penalty for intellectually deficient defendants at the time constituted a national consensus,
noting that the threshhold for national consensus in other cases was much higher (Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 2002). Justice Scalia wrote,
“Even that 47% figure is a distorted one. If one is to say, as the Court does today, that all
executions of the mentally retarded are so morally repugnant as to violate our national
"standards of decency," surely the "consensus" it points to must be one that has set its
righteous face against all such executions. Not 18 States, but only seven -- 18% of death
penalty jurisdictions -- have legislation of that scope.” (Atkins, 536 U.S. at 342, Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Scalia’s argument further attacked the majority’s reliance on the trend of
legislative enactments as indicative of national consensus (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 2002). Specifically, Justice Scalia argued that national legislative trends must move
toward abolition of the death penalty for the intellectually deficient as the only other
direction would be backwards, which is highly unlikely (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 2002). Finally, Justice Scalia rejected the notion that executing defendants that are
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only somewhat intellectually deficient does not further the penological purposes of
deterrence or retribution (Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 2002).
Although the practice of executing the intellectually deficient was rejected by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Atkins, questions still arose regarding what constituted intellectual
deficiency for purposes of the death penalty and whether the defendant’s IQ was an
adequate tool to make such determinations. The Court addressed this issue in Hall v.
Florida (134 S. Ct. 1986, 2014). Following Freddie Hall’s guilty verdict and several
decades of appeals, the central issue in this case was whether Hall’s intellectual
deficiency, if not quanitifiable beyond his IQ, could be considered a mitigating factor
(Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986). In Hall, the Court acknowledged that other factors related to a
person’s general intellectual functioning, in addition to IQ, should be used in to
determine intellectual deficiency. In so doing, the Court rejected the use of 70 as the
cutoff for IQ, noting that this standard was too narrow (Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986). Justice
Kennedy addressed this narrow standard by discussing Florida’s lack of consideration of
measurement error in IQ tests (Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986). Specifically, Justice Kennedy
noted that the average IQ score is about 100, with one standard deviation on an IQ test
being about 15 points (Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986). Florida’s statute at the time defined
intellectual deficiency as a score two standard deviations below the mean, which is how
the state of Florida arrived at the cutoff score of 70 (Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986). However,
Justice Kennedy argued that like many other scientific tests, IQ tests are subject to
measurement error (Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986). Thus, a score of 71 (in Hall’s case) should not
be the only consideration in determining intellectual deficiency (Hall, 134 S. Ct. 1986).
Justice Kennedy stated that sentencing bodies,
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“cannot consider even substantial and weighty evidence of intellectual disability as
measured and made manifest by the defendant’s failure or inability to adapt to his social
and cultural environment, including medical histories, behavioral records, school tests
and reports, and testimony regarding past behavior and family circumstances. This is so
even though the medical community accepts that all of this evidence can be probative of
intellectual disability, including for individuals who have an IQ test score above 70”
(Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1994, Kennedy, J., opinion).
The preceding discussion on the evolution and limits of the death penalty is
instructive, but incomplete. Recently, an over centuries-old debate about pain and
punishment and where this issue fits into a constitutional discussion about the death
penalty has been reignited. The following section presents the issue and discusses recent
challenges to state lethal injection protocols. The discussion about pain and punishment is
a key element within the larger death penalty debate given the historic disagreements
between philosophers (notably Bentham and Hegel) about the extent to which offenders
should experience pain.
The Role of Pain in Punishment. The discussion of the role of pain in
punishment dates to the writings of Hegel, who believed in the value of pain in
punishment, but also viewed offenders as deserving of dignified treatment (McTaggart,
1896).
The U.S. Supreme Court’s constitutional stance on pain has evolved over the last
century, beginning with its decision in Kemmler (136 U.S. 436) that upheld New York’s
use of electrocution as a method of execution. Underlying Chief Justice Fuller’s opinion
in Kemmler was the idea that electrocution was believed to result in instantaneous death
and that such methods were not cruel and unusual. To reiterate, Chief Justice Fuller
stated:
“Punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
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Constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the
mere extinguishment of life” (Kemmler 136 U.S. at 447, Fuller, C.J., opinion).
Thus, the Court from early on has demonstrated a preference for methods of execution
believed to result in as little pain as possible. Justice Reed’s majority opinion in
Resweber reiterates this position. Although this case involved the issue of multiple
attempts at execution, the Court ultimately did not make its determination based on the
aggragate amount of psychological stress a defendant may experience as a result of
multiple execution attempts. Rather, the emphasis centered on whether suffering during
the actual (i.e. the successful) execution attempt itself was excessive. In his concurring
opinion in Furman, Justice Brennan challenged the death penalty itself, fearing that
imposing the death penalty served to deprive the defendant of his or her dignity; similar
to the concerns Hegel expressed with regard to punishing offenders.
How do such ideas apply to the contemporary administration of the death penalty?
A key issue facing many states using lethal injection involves their use of drug protocols
(i.e. the process and the drugs administered) and whether they may result in torture for
the condemned21. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed this issue, with the
discussion specifically directed at the types of drugs used by states. The Court recently
issued two key decisions in Baze v. Rees (553 U.S. 35, 2008) and Glossip v. Gross (135
S. Ct. 2726, 2015) that addressed some of the specifics about the contemporary debate
regarding pain and punishment.
Baze v. Rees (553 U.S. 35, 2008). This case emerges from a challenge to
Kentucky’s three-drug lethal injection protocol. Two inmates challenged the state’s use
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As of 2019, 33 states, the U.S. military and the U.S. government permit defendants to
be executed by lethal injection (Death Penalty Information Center, 2019).
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of sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride, arguing that the
drugs did not sufficiently reduce the pain inmates experience during an execution. The
key consideration that emerged from the Court’s decision in Baze is the idea that if and
when progressively less painful methods of administering lethal injections emerge, states
should consider transitioning to them (Baze, 553 U.S. 35). Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Roberts discussed alternative methods of punishment. Specifically, Chief Justice
Roberts reiterated the standard that petitioners must meet if they are to successfully argue
that a method of punishment does not adequately reduce the amount of pain experienced
in executions. Chief Justice Roberts stated,
“Given what our cases have said about the nature of the risk of harm that is actionable
under the Eighth Amendment, a condemned prisoner cannot successfully challenge a
State's method of execution merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer
alternative...Such an approach finds no support in our cases, would embroil the courts in
ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise, and would substantially intrude
on the role of state legislatures in implementing their execution procedures…” (Baze, 553
U.S. at 51, Roberts, C.J., opinion).
Ultimately, the Court determined in Baze that Kentucky’s three-drug cocktail
sufficiently reduced the pain a condemned person experiences during an execution (Baze,
553 U.S. 35). Key in the ruling, however, are the differing views of Justices Antonin
Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg that help elucidate the debate about pain in punishment.
Before discussing the issue of pain, Justice Scalia responded to Justice Stevens’
claim that the death penalty itself is unconstitutional. In his concurrence, Justice Scalia
drew first on the Fifth Amendment as evidence of the Framers’ support for capital
punishment. This is a logical point given that the Fifth Amendment guarantees the right
to grand jury proceedings for anyone subject to prosecution for a “capital crime.” Further,
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that no one may be deprived of

54

“life” without due process of law (Baze, 553 U.S. 35). In addition to his reliance on the
Fifth Amendment, Justice Scalia attacks Justice Stevens’ assertions that the death penalty
has no deterrent or retributive value (Baze, 553 U.S. 35). Justice Scalia criticized Justice
Stevens’ ignorance of scientific literature that shows the death penalty is a deterrent (even
if a majority of Americans today do not view it as an effective deterrent). In making his
point, Justice Scalia cites a 2005 article in the Stanford Law Review authored by Cass
Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule that presents the results of several studies showing that
the death penalty has deterrent value. More specifically, Scalia calls attention to one of
the studies listed in the article conducted by Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd (2003)
which concluded that every execution deters 18 murders. However, the death penalty’s
deterrent effect continues to be widely debated in the research literature22. Further, Justice
Scalia argued that the Court is in no position to determine whether the death penalty has
retributive value as this is a completely subjective consideration (Baze, 553 U.S. 35).
Justice Scalia also disagrees with Justice Stevens’ assertion that the Eighth
Amendment protects defendants from the kind of pain that the condemened person’s
victim(s) experienced (Baze, 553 U.S. 35). Justice Scalia argued that this conclusion is
faulty in the sense that pain is generally viewed as necessary for retribution; yet Justice
Stevens, who argues that the death penalty has no retributive value, does not believe that
executions should be painful (Baze, 553 U.S. 35). Logically then, one should ask how
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One critic of such studies claiming that the death penalty is an effective deterrent is
Jeffrey Fagan who, along with colleagues, has criticized this entire body of research as
focusing too broadly on all classes of homicides and not specifically capital crimes
(Fagan, Zimring and & Geller, 2005, pg. 1806). This is an important methodological
criticism of this body of work and one that Justice Scalia failed to acknowledge in his
concurring opinion.
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anyone can reject the death penalty for lacking retributive value while asserting that the
infliction of pain yields a punishment that is unconstitutional.
In her dissenting opinion in Baze, Justice Ginsburg espoused an alternative view.
Like Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg opposes the unnecessary infliction of pain in
executions and drew upon several cases in the Court’s history (see Wilkerson, Kemmler
and Resweber) to support her assertion that the Court has long rejected the infliction of
excessive pain. Justice Ginsburg called for the state of Kentucky to consider specific
practices aimed at ensuring that inmates are in fact unconscious after being injected with
sodium thiopental, the first drug in the state’s lethal injection cocktail (Baze, 553 U.S.
35). Justice Ginsburg believed that under Kentucky’s protocols, a conscious inmate who
is subjected to the second and third drugs (pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride)
would almost certainly experience excrutiating pain (Baze, 553 U.S. 35). Justice
Ginsburg suggested several ways that officials could confirm an inmate is unconscious
(i.e. by touching the inmate’s eyelashes or simply shaking the inmate and calling out his
or her name) and noted that many states have already implemented such checks as
standard procedure (Baze, 553 U.S. 35). Ultimately, however, Justice Ginsburg believes
that other constitutional issues may arise if states were not to employ newer, less painful
methods of execution (Baze, 553 U.S. 35). For these states, it is possible that those
involved in the administration of executions could be totally unaware that a condemned
person is experiencing a constitutionally unacceptable amount of pain. Lacking such
consistency across states, one cannot be certain that constitutional violations do not
regularly occur.
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Glossip v. Gross (135 S.Ct. 2726, 2015). The Glossip case arose from the
attempted execution of Clayton Lockett in Oklahoma. The three-drug combination used
in Lockett’s execution took nearly 40 minutes to kill him, but the controversy in this case
centers on the first drug in the cocktail, midazolam. Even after Oklahoma agreed to use a
new four-drug combination following Lockett’s execution, midazolam became the
centerpiece of the petitioners’ challenge to the U.S. Supreme Court. The question in
Glossip was whether midazolam could reduce the risk of pain experienced by defendants
so as not to create excessive pain during executions. At 5-4, this ruling was quite narrow;
and the Justices used separate opinions to address the issues regarding the
constitutionality of the death penalty and the reduction of pain in executions (Glossip,
135 S. Ct. 2726).
In Glossip (135 S. Ct. 2726), the majority suggested that less painful methods of
punishment, if available, may be appropriate. This reiterates Justice Ginsburg’s assertion
in Baze. However, the Court also noted that it is the responsibility of the defendant to find
those alternatives if making the argument that current lethal injection protocols violate
the Eighth Amendment. Relying on Baze, the majority determined that defendants must
also show that available alternatives would reduce the pain of the execution by a
substantial amount (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726). The key to this decision lies in the word
“substantial” and the Court emphasized the reduction of pain must be more than merely
marginal (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726). Writing for the Court in Glossip, Justice Samuel
Alito argued that the defendants failed to establish that readily available alternatives were
substantially less painful (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726). Justice Alito also criticized
petitioners’ reliance on the Court’s previous decision in Hill v. McDonough (547 U.S.
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573, 2006); which dealt with defendant responsibility in seeking an alternative method as
a civil matter and not as an Eighth Amendment issue.
Further, Justice Alito argued that since the death penalty has long been viewed as
accepted practice, there must be a constitutional way to administer it (Glossip, 135 S. Ct.
2726). Justice Alito disgreed that it would be unconstitutional to revert to “more
primitive” methods of execution that were used prior to lethal injection becoming the
norm (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726). Such primitive methods, according to Justice Alito,
include a firing squad23 (which the principal dissent in this case addresses) but would also
include lethal gas24 and electrocution25 (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726). Ultimately, however,
the real question centered on what was meant by “more primitive.” In Glossip, “more
primitive” appears to refer to a range of methods of execution that are constitutional and
if properly administered, would not result in torture. Justice Alito does not appear to
make the claim that “devolving” would harken back to a time when drawing and
quartering, for instance, would have been acceptable. Justice Alito was simply making
the point that if the death penalty is constitutional and no reasonable means of
administering lethal injections exists, the alternative may be to turn to other
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As of 2019, Mississippi, Oklahoma and Utah permit executions by firing squad.
However, lethal injection is still considered the primary method of execution in each state
(Death Penalty Information Center, 2019).
24
As of 2019, Alabama, Arizona, California, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma and
Wyoming permit executions by lethal gas. However, lethal injection is still considered
the primary method of execution in each state (Death Penalty Information Center, 2019).
25
As of 2019, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia permit executions by electrocution. However, lethal
injection is still considered the primary method of execution in each state (Death Penalty
Information Center, 2019).
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constitutionally acceptable methods of punishment unless and until the death penalty is
deemed unconstitutional.
Theoretically, the ruling in Glossip does not completely close the door on future
lethal injection claims although it may do so in practice. Given that defendants must be
the ones to find a more than marginally less painful drug alternative, the outlook is bleek
at best. If defendants were able to find a drug that eliminated pain in executions, states
would do well (and would probably be constitutionally required) to use this drug.
However, it seems unlikely that such a drug will ever be manufactured or even
discovered. Pain is also subjective. Thus, knowing exactly when an alternative drug
reaches the threshhold of “substantially reducing the pain” is difficult at best. Given the
Court’s stance on this issue, it also seems unlikely that states would “devolve” to drugs
that caused defendants to experience a substantially greater amount of pain than the
currently available options, eliminating the need to challenge the use of such drugs. Thus,
practically speaking, a future successful lethal injection claim seems highly unlikely.
Justice Sotomayor disagreed that the burden of finding less painful alternatives
rests on the defendants (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726) Specifically, Justice Sotomayor
asserted that the Court has set as a condition that a drug only creates an unconstitutional
amount of pain and suffering if and only if no viable, less painful alternatives exist
(Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726). However, such a condition would violate what Justice
Sotomayor saw as a long recognized categorical exclusion of all cruel and unusual
punishments (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726).
Further, Justice Sotomayor wondered how such responsibility lies with the
defendant when the use of midazolam creates a punishment that in her mind is
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tantamount to being burned at the stake (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726). Essentially, Justice
Sotomayor questioned the expert testimony provided during the proceedings in this case
regarding the effectiveness of midazolam and on this point, rejected the Court’s
conclusion that the defendants had failed to establish a constitutional violation (Glossip,
135 S. Ct. 2726). On the issue of known and available alternatives, Justice Sotomayor
argued that the Court in Glossip misinterpreted the Baze ruling. Justice Sotomayor further
asserted that Baze did not require defendants to prove that a less painful alternative was
available. The ruling only required defendants to show that a substantial risk of pain was
involved (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726).
The oral arguments presented in Glossip present a glimpse into how the Court
would ultimately decide the issues raised. During oral arguments, Justice Alito and
petitioners’ counsel’s exchange presented a problematic paradox for the petitioners. In
Baze, the Court upheld the use of sodium thiopental as capable of properly sedating a
defendant, a point petitioners’ counsel presented during oral arguments in Glossip (135
S.Ct. 2726). Justice Alito posed the question of why sodium thiopental was not used
during Lockett’s execution in Oklahoma, to which petitioners’ counsel responded that the
drug had been unavailable at the time (Glossip v. Gross, 2015). Given that the entire
constitutional challenge in Glossip rested on midazolam’s effectiveness, the problem
centers on how the state of Oklahoma should be expected to use an arguably more
effective drug (i.e. sodium thiopental) when that drug is unavailable and why midazolam
is not a viable alternative, even if some pain is present.
Justice Alito emphasized that the Court has consistently ruled that the death
penalty is constitutional (Glossip v. Gross, 2015). He also noted that people are free to
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look to state legislatures and the U.S. Supreme Court to overturn the death penalty.
However, there is an inherent contradiction in an abolitionist position that has made it
increasingly difficult for states to administer pain free executions. Justice Alito further
argued that abolitionists have accomplished this goal by helping block states’ access to
drugs that could be used to administer the death penalty in a more humane manner
(Glossip v. Gross, 2015). One way abolitionists have limited states’ access to drugs is by
lobbying overseas drug makers to halt production of paralytic agents such as sodium
thiopental and pentobarbital when such drugs are to be used in executions (Glossip, 135
S. Ct. 2726). Justice Alito described how the production of sodium thiopental came to a
halt in the United States in 2009 only to be subsequently moved to Italy (Glossip, 135 S.
Ct. 2726). Activists, however, would eventually persuade the Italian government and the
drug manufacturer to stop production of sodium thiopental for purposes of carrying out
executions in the United States (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726). Once states ran out of sodium
thiopental, they would eventually turn to pentobarbital, manufactured in Denmark
(Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726). Eventually, however, anti-death penalty activists convinced
the manufacturer to cease production of this drug for use in executions in the United
States (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726). Ultimately, Justice Alito would view the shipment of
paralytic drugs overseas as a major hinderance to carrying out a constitutional
punishment given the success of the anti-death penalty movement in this area, hence the
contradiction.
An examination of Baze (553 U.S. 35) and Glossip (135 S. Ct. 2726)
demonstrates substantial agreement between Justices Scalia and Alito and their views on
pain in punishment. Neither Justice believes that pain free executions are necessary to
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comport with the Constitution (see Baze, 553 U.S. 35 and Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726).
However, both Justices reach this conclusion in different ways. Justice Scalia argues that
it is problematic to assert that the death penalty has no retributive effect while
simultaneously claiming that executions should be pain free (Baze, 553 U.S. 35). Justice
Alito, on the other hand, is less concerned with the penological justifications for the death
penalty and examines the issue in a more nuanced manner. He does not accept the
assertion that states are required to eliminate pain in executions in light of the fact that
abolitionists have assisted states in blocking access to more effective pain mitigating
drugs (i.e. sodium thiopental) (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726).
One might argue that the ruling in Glossip (135 S. Ct. 2726) is a setback for
abolitionists. The Court is acknowledging that despite the possibility that painful or even
botched executions may occur, that it is willing to grant states discretion in choosing their
lethal injection drugs.
The death penalty debate in the United States is ongoing. Abolitionists are now
focusing their efforts on another issue with potentially tremendous Eighth Amendment
implications: delay. Delay in executions as an Eighth Amendment issue has long been
rejected by the Supreme Court but recently found its way to a U.S. District Court. The
Central District of California’s ruling in Jones v. Chappell (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct,
C.D. Cal 2014), even though this ruling was recently overturned by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals on procedural grounds26 represents what is potentially a major shift in
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Judge Paul Watford of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit delivered the
opinion of the Court; ruling that the U.S. District Court did not have the authority to
decide on novel Constitutional questions such as excessive delay during habeas corpus
review (see Jones v. Davis, 2015, 9th Cir.).
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our understanding (and at the very least the legal recognition) of delay and where it fits in
the Eighth Amendment discussion.27 Prior to discussing the ruling in Jones, a brief
examination of delay-related claims rejected by the U.S. Supreme Court is instructive.
Death Penalty Delay
Given that some delay in case processing time is acceptable so that death row
defendants have an adequate opportunity to show that their death sentences are
unconstitutional, the current project focuses specifically on the appeals process beyond
the direct appeal. The challenge becomes determining at what point extended case
processing time becomes delay. Further, are there other issues such as the mental or
physical state of the defendant that may help in making this determination? Death penalty
delay combined with the defendant’s eventual execution forms the basis of a Lackey
Claim. What follows is an examination of the procedural history of Lackey Claims in the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Lackey Claims. The term Lackey Claim has its roots in the original case that
came before the U.S. Supreme Court involving a challenge to the practice of carrying out
executions after long periods of delay (Lackey v Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1995).
Specifically, in this case, Clarence Allen Lackey had been on death row for 17 years
before making the claim that his prolonged death row confinement combined with his
eventual execution violated the cruel and unusual provision of the Eighth Amendment.
Justice Stevens acknowledged in Lackey (514 U.S. 1045) that the claim was, at the very
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Although in Part III of his dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross (135 S. Ct. 2726,
2015), Justice Breyer talks at length about the issue of delay. Specifically, Justice Breyer
argues that a death penalty system fraught with delay serves no legitimate penological
purpose and would not have been what was envisioned by the Framers when the Bill of
Rights was ratified.
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least, novel and interesting. Although ultimately respecting his colleagues’ denial of
certiorari, Justice Stevens did not close the door on such claims, saying that the topic may
be ripe for discussion after similar claims make their way through lower federal courts
(Lackey, 514 U.S. 1045). Justice Stevens openly questioned whether carrying out
executions after such long periods of time furthers the two classic penological
justifications for the death penalty; deterrence and retribution. Also noteworthy is that
more than a century prior to the denial of certiorari in Lackey, the Court had already
questioned the utility of executions given the uncertainty created by long periods spent
awaiting executions (In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 1890). Finally, Justice Stevens
reminded the Court that international opinion has not favored executions after long
periods of delay (Pratt v. Attorney General of Jamaica, 4 A11 E.R. 769, 1994).
Ultimately, Justice Stevens’ commentary in Lackey was very prescient as many of these
same points would inform this debate over the next couple decades.
Comparable challenges have arisen in the years since Lackey with similar
outcomes (see Table 2.2). Despite the lack of success, Lackey Claim proponents have at
least one major advocate on the bench, Justice Steven Breyer. Also, what this series of
cases reveals is that new elements are constantly being added to the Lackey discussion
that may give its proponents hope for success. In Elledge v. Florida (525 U.S. 944, 1998),
for instance, Justice Breyer presented the issue of state-created delay. Justice Breyer
dissented from the denial of certiorari in Elledge which involved a challenge from an
inmate who had spent 23 years on death row. In his dissent, Justice Breyer pondered how
the state might be at fault for long delays particularly when the state’s appellate
procedures are inadequate (Elledge, 525 U.S. 944). Justice Breyer also cited international
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opinion as indicative of the point that executions following long periods of delay may be
constitutionally unacceptable. Drawing on Soering v. United Kingdom (11 EHRR 439,
1989), Justice Breyer noted the potential reluctance of foreign courts to extradite capital
offenders to the United States stemming from concerns that these defendants will
experience inhumane treatment as a result of extended periods of death row confinement
(Elledge, 525 U.S. 944).

Table 2.2-Lackey Claims Denied Certiorari by the United State Supreme Court
Seminal Case

Year

State/Jurisdiction

Years Since Sentence

Lackey v. Texas
514 U.S. 1045

1995

Texas

17

Other Cases

Year

State/Jurisdiction

Years Since Sentence

Elledge v. Florida
525 U.S. 944

1998

Florida

23

Knight v. Florida
528 U.S. 990

1999

Florida

20

Foster v. Florida
537 U.S. 990

2002

Florida

27

Smith v. Arizona
552 U.S. 985

2007

Arizona

30

Allen v. Ornoski
546 U.S. 1136

2006

California

23

Johnson v. Bredesen
130 S.Ct. 531

2009

Tennessee

29

Thompson v. McNeil
129 S.Ct. 1299

2009

Florida

32

Valle v. Florida
132 S.Ct. 1

2011

Florida

33
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Table 2.2-Lackey Claims Denied Certiorari by the United State Supreme Court
(cont.)
Other Cases
Year State/Jurisdiction Years Since Sentence
Moore v. Texas
137 S.Ct. 103928

2017

Texas

35

The following year in Knight v. Florida (528 U.S. 990, 1999), Justice Breyer took
a harder stance on the issue of state-created delay by stating bluntly that delays lasting for
periods of more than 20 years must be the result of an inadequate appellate process.
Justice Clearance Thomas presented an interesting counterargument in his decision to
deny certiorari. Justice Thomas argued that it would simply be illogical to provide death
row inmates with numerous appeals only to ultimately conclude that the resulting delay is
unconstitutional (Knight, 528 U.S. 990). Although a compelling point, Justice Breyer
would likely make the counterargument that Justice Thomas’ analysis does not reconcile
the problem of state-created delay and it essentially assumes that any period of delay is
acceptable if defendants exhaust all their appeals.
These same issues were again presented in Foster v. Florida (537 U.S. 990, 2002).
Foster involved a challenge from a defendant who had spent 27 years on death row.
Again dissenting, Justice Breyer supplemented his argument by presenting data on the
average period of death row confinement which, at the time, was between 11 and 12
years (Foster, 537 U.S. 990). Using this figure, Justice Breyer concluded that Foster’s
time on death row must be unusual, given the disparity between his time on death row
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This case, in which the Supreme Court heard oral arguments on November 29, 2016,
also addressed whether prohibiting the use of current standards of determining
intellectual disability and requiring the use of old standards violates the Eighth
Amendment. The Court granted certiorari on this question but not on the Lackey issue.
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compared to the national average (Foster, 537 U.S. 990). Further, Justice Breyer, using
what might be considered an arbitrary number for what should be the upper limit on
delay, argued that executing a defendant after 30 years exceeded the threshold for cruelty
(see Smith v. Arizona, 552 U.S. 985, 2007).
In another case, Justice Breyer added that the defendant’s mental or physical state
should be considered. In Allen v. Ornoski (546 U.S. 1136, 2006), Justice Breyer
questioned whether an inmate who had been on death row for 23 years but had reached
the age of 76, was blind and confined to a wheelchair was constitutionally acceptable.
Finally, in two cases denied review in 2009, Justice Breyer continued to acknowledge the
merits of Lackey Claims while Justice Thomas continued to deny their value. In Johnson
v. Bredesen (130 S.Ct. 541, 2009), and Thompson v. McNeil (129 S.Ct. 1299, 2009),
Justice Breyer argued that delays of 29 and 32 years respectively are unacceptable and
deserve consideration by the Court. Also, in both cases, Justice Breyer continued to assert
that states must be at fault for such long delays. The most recent attempt made by a
defendant to argue the constitutionality of the death penalty following a long period of
delay was denied by the Court in 2011 and involved a defendant who had been on death
row for 33 years (Valle v. Florida, 132 S.Ct. 1, 2011). Drawing on the length of Valle’s
delay relative to the average period spent on death row in the United States, Justice
Breyer again argued in favor of allowing this type of case to be heard by the Court (Valle,
132 S.Ct. 1). However, the Court again denied certiorari. Justice Breyer would continue
to address the problems with delay in Part III of his dissent in Glossip, noting that delays
at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted were extremely rare with executions
typically occurring within days of sentencing. Ultimately, the dilemma that Justice
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Breyer believes is most difficult to reconcile is how to solve the problem of delay without
diminishing the procedural safeguards that must be in place when someone’s life is at
stake (Glossip, 135 S. Ct. 2726).
If the U.S. Supreme Court is ever to grant review to a Lackey-type case, the cases
cited herein provide a somewhat grim outlook. However, even in light of an increasingly
long history of rejection, Justice Stevens’ sentiments in Lackey should be reexamined.
More specifically, Justice Stevens acknowledged that challenges based on delay may be
ripe for review after lower federal courts have had the opportunity to address the issue.
Although one court decision is hardly enough for a consensus on the issue, Lackey
proponents arguably scored their first major victory in July 2014, notwithstanding the
setback they would experience in 2015 when the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit overturned the lower court’s decision. This case, however, is still significant in
that for the first time, a federal judge acknowledged that delay in the death penalty is a
significant problem worthy of official review.
Jones v. Chappell (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Jones v.
Chappell, (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014) represents a tremendous shift in
thought about the issue of delay in the federal court system. For the first time, a federal
court declared that an entire state’s death penalty system violated the Eighth Amendment
when Judge Cormac Carney determined that California’s death penalty system in no way
furthered the two penological purposes of deterrence and retribution (31 F. Supp. 3rd
1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Judge Carney’s views of the death penalty regarding
California death row inmates were summed up as follows,
“…systemic delay has made their execution so unlikely that the death sentence carefully
and deliberately imposed by the jury has been quietly transformed into one no rational
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jury or legislature could ever impose: life in prison, with the remote possibility of death”
(31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014 at 1-2).
Ultimately, the state of California may have created a death penalty system fraught with
the same issues of arbitrariness that the U.S. Supreme Court previously tried to remedy
(Furman, 408 U.S. 238). In his opinion, Judge Carney provided an analysis of
California’s death penalty process and illustrates the time required to complete each step.
Judge Carney delineated the time required to file appeals, procure attorneys and have
appeals heard at both the state and federal levels.
To begin, California reinstated the death penalty in 1978 and prior to Judge
Carney’s ruling, had sentenced over 900 defendants to death (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist.
Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). However, of these individuals, the state had only executed 13 of them
(31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Such a disparity may leave one
wondering what the purpose of California’s death penalty system was and moreover,
what is so different about the 13 individuals who were ultimately executed compared to
those who were not? Judge Carney cites several figures, which suggest that being
executed in California was based on little more than chance and that those who were
executed were no more criminally culpable than those who were not.
Citing figures from the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
Judge Carney noted that 94 (or roughly 10 percent) of the individuals sentenced to death
died of natural causes while 39 had their death sentences commuted by the federal court
system, never to be resentenced to death (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014).
However, 748 individuals remained on California’s death row as of Judge Carney’s 2014
ruling (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). What is potentially troubling is the
fact that more than 40 percent of California’s death row inmates had been on death row
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for a period of at least 19 years (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). But what
are the specific reasons for such long delays? Citing figures from the California
Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice (the Commission), Judge Carney
addressed the factors believed to contribute to delay (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D.
Cal 2014). Releasing their final report in 2008, the Commission identified issues in 3
separate stages of the process; delays on direct appeal, delays in state collateral appeal
and delays in federal collateral appeal.
California, unlike many other death penalty states, does not require all death
sentences to be automatically reviewed by the state supreme court, although many are (31
F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). On average, death row defendants will wait
11.7 to 13.7 years between filing the direct appeal and the California Supreme Court
rendering a decision (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). The Commission
identified several reasons that affect time on appeal. First, California death row inmates
wait an average of 3-5 years to obtain counsel to file the appeal itself (31 F. Supp. 3rd
1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Further complicating this process is the fact that the state
of California has minimum standards attorneys must meet to be qualified to litigate death
penalty appeals; mainly that the attorneys have at least four years of law practice (31 F.
Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Judge Carney seems to put less weight on this
requirement as the primary issue though, noting that there are more than enough attorneys
in California with enough experience. Instead, Judge Carney concludes that such delays
are tied to broader issues of underfunding of the state’s death penalty system (31 F. Supp.
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3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014)29. Procuring an attorney who is qualified to handle the
appeal is only part of the problem. New issues arise when the attorney (who may be
different than the defendant’s trial attorney) must take the time to become familiar with
the case record, research the applicable law and subsequently file the appeallate brief,
which is then followed by the state’s reply brief as well as an additional brief filed by the
plaintiff’s attorney (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). When all is said and
done, these briefs may take up to an additional 4 years to complete (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050,
Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). The California Supreme Court must then place the case on its
docket. The California Supreme Court hears only an average of 20-25 death penalty
appeals per year (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Considering the number
of inmates on the state’s death row, additional delays are certain (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050,
Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). On average, direct appeal will take an additional 2-3 years (31
F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014).
Beyond direct appeal, state collateral appeal presents its own hardships for death
row inmates. Collateral (Habeas Corpus) appeal is simply the inmate challenging the
constitutionality of his or her confinement (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal
2014). The California Supreme Court advises inmates to seek state habeas relief shortly
after the death sentence is imposed so that either a private attorney or an attorney from
the Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC) will have adequate time to familiarize
themselves with the case record (if a new attorney will be handling collateral appeals),
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See Bright, S. (1997). Neither equal nor just: The rationing and denial of legal services
to the poor when life and liberty are at stake. Ann. Surv. Am. L. 783. Bright’s work
presents the case that many states are not able provide adequate pre or post-trial
representation and resources to indigent defendants even in the years following the U.S.
Supreme Court’s ruling in Gideon v. Wainwright (372 U.S. 335, 1963).
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research the merits of any constitutional or statutory challenges involved and file the
appropriate briefs (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). In practice, defendants
wait an average of 8-10 years following their death sentence before they can file a state
collateral appeal. If the inmate is able to secure counsel for the appeal, particularly courtappointed habeas counsel, funding issues place limits on the attorneys’ ability to
investigate the merits of any constitutional or statutory issues that may be present and
limit the attorneys’ ability to procure necessary experts (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct,
C.D. Cal 2014). As of June 2014, 359 of California’s death row inmates did not have
habeas counsel and of those, 159 had been waiting on the appointment of such counsel
for at least 10 years (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). In light of this fact,
one wonders what effect the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Ross v. Moffitt (417 U.S.
600, 1974) may have. In Ross, the Court held that indigent defendants do not have an
absolute right to counsel in any discretionary appeal. The Court reasoned that
discretionary appeals are distinct from trials in the sense that trials involve a process of
finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt whereas appeals by their nature involve those
who have already been found guilty (Ross, 417 U.S. 600). While appeals are undeniably
valuable to defendants, the Court views them as more of a privilege for purposes of equal
protection (Ross, 417 U.S. 600).
After a collateral petition is filed, the California Supreme Court needs an average
of 22 months to issue its ruling (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Judge
Carney noted, however, that this figure is only current as of 2008 when the Commission
released its findings and further noted that available evidence suggests that this figure has
doubled. As of Judge Carney’s ruling, there were 176 pending collateral appeals before
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the California Supreme Court and an average of 49 months had passed since the appeals
were filed (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014).
Finally, Judge Carney indicated that issues related to delay in the appeals process
are not limited to California and that many issues exist in the federal court system as
well. Once defendants have exhausted all of their state-level appeals, they may file for
habeas relief in federal district court that may eventually result in additional appeals to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and ultimately the U.S. Supreme Court
(31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Often, however, new issues arise at the
federal level and the case is sent back to the California Supreme Court for further
proceedings (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). These are known as
exhaustion appeals and they take, on average, an additional 3.2 years to decide (31 F.
Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Overall, as of 2008, the entire federal appeals
process for California’s death row inmates took an average of 10.4 years (31 F. Supp. 3rd
1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Since California reinstated the death penalty in 1978,
only 81 defendants have been able to exhaust all their appeals while the state has only
executed 13 people in that time (31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014).
In total, California death row inmates can expect to wait an average of 25 years
before exhausting all their appeals, assuming they are even able to do so at all (31 F.
Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). Judge Carney, like Justice Breyer in his dissent
in Glossip (135 S. Ct. 2726), viewed such delay as somewhat of a paradox. When the
U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Furman, Justice Stewart is famously quoted
describing the arbitrary nature of the death penalty and that the Constitution,
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“cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that permit this
unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed” (Furman 408 U.S. at 310,
Stewart, J., concurring).
Judge Carney reiterated this sentiment in asserting that an arbitrarily imposed death
penalty does not advance the two penological purposes of deterrence and retribution,
which supporters of capital punishment argue that the death penalty achieves.
The paradox then, is that while defendants have a right to a fair process,
particularly when their lives hang in the balance, the appeals process in California that
seeks to ensure fairness is the very same process that is creating unfairness by creating
delays that are excessive, resulting in a penalty that is being arbitrarily imposed.
Serious questions have been raised about how California’s death penalty system
or any other death penalty system in the United States represents a significant
improvement over the arbitrariness discussed in Furman. It is easy to make the argument
that executing only 13 people out of over 900 that have been sentenced to death since
1978 is the epitome of the wanton and freakish imposition of the death penalty against
which Justice Stewart warned in his concurrence in Furman (408 U.S. 238). Judge
Carney recognizes this fact but why have other states been so slow to respond? And why
has the U.S. Supreme Court failed to recognize this contradiction in its own decision in
the more than two decades that have passed since Lackey (514 U.S. 1045)? These
questions do not have simple answers. Perhaps, for some reason, state legislatures and the
U.S. Supreme Court do not believe the issue is ripe for review. Ultimately, however,
Judge Carney’s ruling in Jones represents a significant step toward recognition of this
issue having constitutional importance and it potentially serves as the impetus other
federal judges need to address the issue. Although the ruling is still short of Justice
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Stevens’ vision of having the issue percolate through the lower courts, it is a start. What
is certain is that delay matters in analyzing the merits of the death penalty. Moreover, the
issue of delay raises several additional legal and practical issues.
The Issue of Delay and Why Effectiveness Matters. The U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Trop (356 U.S. 86, 1958) introduced the concept of evolving standards of
decency. This concept reminds us that as society matures and progresses, that we should
revisit and refine our ideas and methods of punishment. The precise meaning of evolving
standards of decency has continued to develop over time and while it is a fluid concept,
the Court has identified several objective factors to assess whether various forms of
punishment comport with the concept. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted in Penry (492
U.S. 302, 1989) that state legislative enactments may be instructive depending on the
direction and pace of change in such enactments regarding a particular practice. In 2005,
Justice Kennedy added the additional factor of scientific evidence, noting that such
evidence should be considered in determining evolving standards of decency (Roper, 543
U.S. 551). Specifically, Justice Kennedy discusses the idea that juveniles are inherently
more susceptible to immature and erratic behavior that may not be indicative of future
criminality (Roper, 543 U.S. 551). Drawing on the field of psychiatry, Justice Kennedy
noted,
“It is difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender
whose crime reflects irreparable corruption…If trained psychiatrists with the advantage
of clinical testing and observation refrain, despite diagnostic expertise, from assessing
any juvenile under 18 as having antisocial personality disorder, we conclude that states
should refrain from asking jurors to issue a far graver condemnation--that a juvenile
offender merits the death penalty.” (Roper 543 U.S. at 573, Kennedy, J., opinion).
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As a third factor, Justice Kennedy believes it is important to draw on international
opinion, even if international court decisions are not binding on American law and
practice (Roper, 543 U.S. 551).
But what do these factors mean in the context of the death penalty? The Eighth
Amendment protects citizens against cruel and unusual punishment. The psychological
damage many death row inmates experience may be deserving of further consideration by
the Court based on its own conception of evolving standards of decency. The
international community, for instance, has already addressed the issues related to
extended periods of delay (see Soering and Pratt). Further, Dr. Stuart Grassian’s research
on the death row phenomenon may be an importnt first step toward satisfying Justice
Kennedy’s belief that scientific evidence is an important consideration. However, the
largest hurdle proponents of Lackey claims would have to overcome is getting state
legislatures to recognize the merits of the death row phenomenon. As such, revisiting Dr.
Grassian’s findings and examining other scholars’ work may be instructive.
The basis for the death row phenomenon can be found in Dr. Grassian’s research
on inmates and solitary confinement (Grassian, 1983). Although the effects of long-term
incarceration in general cannot be understated, extended periods of solitary confinement
may lead to several psychological issues including hallucinations, perceptual distortions
and paranoia (Grassian, 1983). Numerous other scholars have found links between
solitary confinement and various emotional and psychological issues including insomnia
(Haney, 1993), anxiety (Anderson, Sestof, Lilleback, Gabrielsen, Hemmingsen and
Kramp 2000; Haney, 1993), depression (Anderson et al., 2000), hopelessness (Haney,
1993), suicidal tendencies (Grassian, 1983; Haney, 1993) and self physical harm
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(Benjamin & Lux, 1975) Further, there is evidence that such problems become worse
when prison administrators either disregard or do not provide enough assistance to
inmates under solitary confinement who show signs of severe emotional or psychological
issues (Haney, 2003).
Interestingly, in his work, Dr. Grassian did not classify the inmates under study as
insane. Rather, he concluded that for inmates subjected to extended periods of solitary
confinement, their experience leads them to form “a clinically distinguishable syndrome”
(Grassian, 1983, p. 1453). This distinction is critical in an Eighth Amendment inquiry. As
noted above, The U.S. Supreme Court has identified certain classes of individuals who
are not eligible for the death penalty due to either psychiatric or intellectual deficiencies
(see Atkins, 536 U.S. 304 and Ford, 477 U.S. 399). The question then is how are those
inmates who suffer from psychological maladies as a result of their death row
confinement not treated as a special class, especially if state actions are responsible for
their deteriorating mental condition? In any event, the mere possibility that state-created
delay in capital punishment may create a distinct class of individuals like those identified
in Ford (477 U.S. 399), for example, is perhaps worthy of consideration by the U.S.
Supreme Court.
Although not binding on American law, precedent does exist for considering
foreign laws and customs in shaping American law and practice. An example can be
found in Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Roper (543 U.S. 551, 2005) where he
acknowledged that international legal practice did not favor the execution of juveniles30.

30

Article 37 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits the
death penalty for anyone committing a crime before the age of 18. Justice Kennedy
emphasizes that at the time, every country in the world except for the United States and
77

International courts have also addressed the issue of delay, citing concerns with
extraditing defendants to the United States given the possibility of the “death row
phenomenon” resulting from lengthy periods of death row confinement (Soering, 11
EHRR 439). Further, In Pratt (4 A11 E.R. 769), the Privy Council31 noted that prolonged
periods of death row confinement amount to unacceptably inhumane treatment and are
inherently degrading. Overall, relying on international opinion may be beneficial
particularly when drawing upon trends in other countries whose legal systems are based
in Anglo traditions. The United States is relatively young compared to some of these
other nations that, for all intents and purposes, have a much longer and more thoughtful
history with regard to penology, philosophy and legal practice. The drawback, however,
is that the United States may lose its sense of autonomy when trying to apply best
practices from other countries to American correctional problems.
In the end, there remains a question of why American death row inmates spend so
much time on death row. The obvious answer to this question may be simply the breadth
of appeals available to death row inmates at both the state and federal levels. Judge
Carney’s delineation of the process California’s death row inmates experience is telling
in the sense that it reveals the complexity and cumbersome nature of the appellate
process. What is less clear, however, are the reasons that each of these steps in the

Somalia had ratified this. See also ICCPR, Art. 6(5), 999 U. N. T. S., at 175 (prohibiting
capital punishment for anyone under 18 at the time of offense); American Convention on
Human Rights: Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, Art. 4(5), Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U. N. T. S.
146 (entered into force July 19, 1978) and African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of
the Child, Art. 5(3), OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29,
1999).
31
The Privy Council is the highest court of appeal for many countries that comprise the
United Kingdom as well as its overseas territories and other subsidiary courts (Judicial
Committee of the Privy Council. https://www.jcpc.uk/about/role-of-the-jcpc.html).
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process takes so long to resolve. Is the appellate process itself fundamentally flawed?
Should we focus more on case attributes as potential explanations for the delay that death
row inmates experience? Do more complex death penalty cases impact time on death
row? The next section will attempt to provide some insight into how the complex nature
of death penalty cases may plausibly explain the extraordinary length of time that many
inmates spend on death row.
Case Complexity
Defining Case Complexity. What is case complexity? James Cauthen and Barry
Latzer (2000) attempted to operationalize case complexity by examining the number of
headnotes and the length of appellate court opinions for both capital and non-capital
cases in the state of New Jersey (Cauthen & Latzer, 2000). Their findings demonstrate
how case complexity can help explain why capital cases take significantly longer to
process than non-capital cases. Although instructive, their findings are based on several
potentially questionable assumptions. With regard to the number of headnotes that appear
in capital and non-capital appellate opinions, the assumption the authors make is that a
greater number of headnotes equates to a greater number of issues that come up on appeal
that would result in an increase in processing time. It is entirely possible that a new
headnote does not introduce a new issue that makes the case more complex.
Further, Cauthen and Latzer (2008) conclude that, controlling for all other factors,
increasing the length of an opinion by one page results in a 1.3 percent increase in case
processing time. However, opinion length as a measure of case complexity ignores the
possibility that some judges simply have different writing styles than other judges. Thus,
it is difficult to conclude that an opinion of 30 pages in length presents issues that are
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truly more complex than an opinion that is 20 pages in length if the latter judge simply
writes in a more concise manner than the former judge.
Where criminology has come up short in measuring case complexity and
examining its relationship with case processing time, the legal literature may offer some
insight that helps begin to move our understanding of the issue forward. Heise (2004)
provided what are arguably the most comprehensive measures of case complexity to date
by accounting for the differences between how juries, judges and attorneys perceive case
complexity. For example, Heise (2004) found differences between actors’ perceptions of
case complexity when the issue was measured by looking at individual factors of judges,
juries, and attorneys as well as trial characteristics such as the number of defendants,
number of victims, number of expert witnesses, whether there was a prior hung jury and
trial length measured by number of trial days. Heise (2004) also finds considerable
variation when examining death penalty cases versus other types of cases, noting that
juries perceive death penalty cases to be more complex than other cases. Finally,
although acknowledging relatively weak support for the influence of geography on
perceptions of case complexity, Heise (2004) notes that such a relationship exists.
Stuart Ford (2014), on the one hand, takes a much different approach. As Ford
(2014) explains,
“…something is complex when it is composed of many interconnected parts such that
their interaction makes the whole difficult to understand or analyze. Complexity then
becomes the state or condition of having these attributes. Thus….complexity occurs
when multiple parts of a system interconnect and interact in such a way that the whole
system becomes hard to understand or analyze (p. 12).”
Over time, the multiple parts that comprise complex court systems and processes have
taken on many forms in the empirical and legal literature. Stempel (1998) does not
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provide an actual definition of complexity but prefers to frame complexity using specific
factors including: the number of litigants, the difficulties in bringing litigants and claims
together, multiple forums (or multiple courts addressing the same issue), case processing
time, difficulties related to choosing the applicable law, the technical nature of a case and
a host of other issues related to what specifically is being litigated as well as attorney
competence. Ford’s (2014) definition, on the other hand, may be applied to any number
of situations from criminal cases to the natural sciences and everything in between.
Stempel’s (1998) framing of complexity is arguably more useful in moving us closer to
an understanding of how case complexity potentially impacts the death penalty in that he
suggests specific variables to explore.
In any event, much of our current understanding about case complexity and its
effects on the outcome of trials comes primarily from an examination of American civil
trials (Ford, 2014). Although this literature (including Ford’s 2014 work) is informative,
defining and measuring case complexity has proven to be anything but a simple
undertaking (Heise, 2004).
Case Complexity and the U.S. Supreme Court. One of the simplest measures of
case complexity can be found in Scott Johnson’s (1999) work examining how complexity
may influence the number of opinions in cases that come before the U.S. Supreme Court.
Specifically, Johnson (1999) posited that two factors make cases more complex and
influence the number of concurring and dissenting opinions that are authored. The first
factor is the number of legal issues raised. The number of legal issues raised is expected
to have a direct relationship with how many separate opinions are drafted. Johnson
(1999) predicted a similar relationship when examining the second predictor of
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complexity, the number of legal provisions present in the case. Examining only those
cases decided from 1986-1990, Johnson’s analysis revealed that when two or more legal
issues are raised, this corresponded with a higher number of cases in which there is one
or more concurring or dissenting opinion. In 91% of the cases in which two or more legal
issues were raised, there was at least one or more concurring or dissenting opinion
(Johnson, 1999). Regarding the number of legal provisions implicated, 87% of those
cases involving two or more legal provisions resulted in one or more concurring or
dissenting opinion (Johnson, 1999).
Case Complexity in Criminal Courts. Criminal trials are cut from a cloth
wholly different from civil cases. A number of these differences take center stage in the
empirical investigations of Heuer and Penrod (1994) and Ford (2014). First, Larry Heuer
and Steven Penrod (1994) examine legal complexity in both civil and criminal trials.
More specifically, their work examines legal complexity, evidence complexity and the
amount of information presented to juries. Additionally, they consider how factors
including the number of witnesses, trial length, number of charges/claims, number of
items of evidence, number of parties, complexity of defense arguments as well as
complexity of prosecution arguments impact case outcomes.
Ford (2014) also provides us with a glimpse of what makes criminal cases
complex. Drawing upon cases from the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), he concludes that these cases are far more complex than cases tried
in the United States. In fact, he argues that many of the cases tried in the ICTY are among
some of the most complex in the world, which means that many of the factors that make
these cases complex are perhaps present in American criminal cases. The reason for this
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increased complexity centers largely on the fact that the ICTY handles cases involving
mass atrocities, which are not common in the United States (Ford, 2014). Nonetheless, he
notes that even cases involving mass atrocities perpetrated in the United States are not of
comparable complexity to the types of cases the ICTY hears. Ford (2014) further outlines
his definition and method of measuring complexity and provides critiques of other
methods of measuring complexity.
Ford (2014) provides critiques of the way other scholars have attempted to define
complexity. For instance, he rejects Tidmarsh’s (1992) definition of complexity. First, he
argues that the definiton used by Tidmarsh (1992) relies on factors that are too closely
related to civil trials to be useful in an assessment of criminal cases. Second, he stresses
the point that it is difficult to know at which point a case goes from being “routine” to
“complex.” As noted above, it is possible that criminal case complexity and more
specifically capital case complexity requires a more nuanced analysis rather than
attempting to dichotomize case complexity.
In terms of measuring complexity, Ford (2014) prefers to use a multi-pronged
approach. Ford (2014), like many other scholars (see Reiber & Weiberg, 2009; Heuer &
Penrod, 1994; Tidmarsh, 1992) views complexity as related to the law, facts of the case
and the participants. Legal complexity is related to the actual law at hand (Ford, 2014).
Cases become complex, for instance, if the law is dense, difficult to interpret, highly
technical or heavily rule-based, relying predominantly on the facts of the case (Ford,
2014). Death penalty statutes may fit this definition if aggravating factors, for instance,
are vague and left to subjective interpretation.
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Factual complexity, unlike legal complexity, addresses the difficulties
surrounding the facts that will ultimately be the subject of legal application (Ford, 2014).
In a death penalty case, the facts may not always be clear given that witnesses’ memories
may fade, evidence may disappear and never be recovered, and multiple crime scenes
may be involved as well as a host of other factors. Regarding the facts, cases become
more complex if facts are technical, difficult or impossible to interpret or there are simply
many facts to consider in a case (Ford, 2014). Finally, participant complexity involves the
specific ways in which actors in the process contribute to case complexity (Ford, 2014).
For example, the ways in which prosecutors or defense attorneys present cases can
influence how complex the case seems (Ford, 2014). Juries may also play a role when
cases seem so overwhelming that they are unable to adequately perform their role (Ford,
2014). Ford (2014) also notes that cases may involve multiple forms of complexity (i.e.
legal and factual complexity together). In such cases, the overall complexity increases
given that both legal and factual complexity have the effect of making the other worse
(Ford, 2014).
In sum, case complexity has been conceptualized in several ways in various
contexts. However, what is missing from the proceeding discussion, and where this study
attempts to fill the gap, is what all of this means in the context of death penalty cases.
There seems little doubt that complex cases affect all actors involved in a wide range of
legal processes and theoretically, death penalty cases should be no different. But what
other processes are at work in death penalty cases that make them extraordinarily
complex and thus result in delay? This study attempts to bridge a huge gap in the
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criminological literature by linking ideas from other disciplines regarding case
complexity and time on death row.
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CHAPTER 3

METHODS

The problem of death penalty delay has long been established anecdotally by the
U.S. Supreme Court, beginning with the Court’s denial of certiorari in Lackey v. Texas
(514 U.S. 1045, 1995). A string of additional cases that have been denied review by the
Court since the Lackey decision have demonstrated that the period of time defendants are
spending on death row prior to petitioning the Court for relief is steadily increasing32. It is
not simply the length of time that is the issue, however. Defendants who spend extended
periods of time on death row are subject to numerous psychological problems (see
Grassian, 1983) and, in general, the cost of imposing and eventually carrying out a death
sentence is significantly higher than imposing a sentence of life without the possibility of
parole (see Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION). Given that the research has been mixed at best
as far as whether the death penalty has any deterrent effect, even a staunch death penalty
advocate may question its utility as a matter of public policy.
But what explains the fact that death penalty delay has become increasingly
commonplace? This study, among the first of its kind, attmepts to address this question
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Allen v. Ornoski, 546 U.S. 1136; Elledge v. Florida, 525 U.S. 944; Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S.
990; Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S.Ct. 541; Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990; Smith v. Arizona, 552
U.S. 985; Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S.Ct. 1299 and Valle v. Florida, 132 S.Ct. 1.
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by examining the nexus between case complexity and delay. This issue has been ignored
in the criminological literature and its inquiries are mainly limited to works in political
science and legal literature. Given the magnitude of this problem and its potential
implications for public policy, an empirical analysis of the link between case complexity
and death penalty delay is warranted.
Study Procedures
In order to investigate the issue of complexity and delay, a database was
constructed using information from all capital cases collected by the Florida Department
of Corrections and the Florida Commission on Capital Cases (the Commission).33
Information was collected on all defendants sentenced to death in Florida from 19752013 (N=406). Although Florida Governor Rick Scott defunded the Commission in 2011,
all information collected prior to its closing is still publicly available on its website. The
database was further supplemented with information extracted from written decisions
from the Florida Supreme Court, U.S. District Courts of Appeal34, the United States
Supreme Court, and appellate briefs submitted by both defendants and the state. Using
key word searches in the Lexis-Nexis database, the researcher obtained information from
initial appellate briefs, reply briefs, supplemental briefs and habeas briefs that were filed
with the Florida Supreme Court and other federal appellate courts. A key advantage of
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In 2011, Florida Governor Rick Scott abolished the Florida Commission on Capital
Cases, which had served as a legal body responsible for reviewing capital convictions in
the state of Florida. (see http://floridainnocence.org/content/?tag=commission-on-capitalcases).
34
There are 3 U.S. District Courts in Florida; the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Florida, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and the
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida (see
http://www.flsd.uscourts.gov/?page_id=7850).
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this approach is that it permits the researcher to gather case-level information that is not
currently available in any other database. Additionally, while the Commission was in
operation, the information obtained was collected on a continuous basis, maximizing its
accuracy. The key pitfall to using information from the Commission is that despite the
accuracy of this information, it is only available thru 2011. However, other sources (see
above) were useful in gathering additional information for cases still pending after 2011
(up to 2013 for the current study).
The preceding design improves upon several previous attempts to assess the
impact of various case and appellate-level factors on case processing time and for this
study, delay. To begin, Judge Carney’s analysis of delay in California’s death penalty
system is instructive but incomplete (Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal
2014). In his opinion, Judge Carney lays out myriad troubling descriptive statistics that
describe the state of affairs in California since 1978. However, Judge Carney’s analysis
does not provide any assessment of what specifically may predict whether delay will
occur (let alone provide a working definition of delay) and certainly not whether case
complexity plays a role. Sipes (1984) chronicles a range of issues related to court delay at
the state level and various measures that have been implemented in order to combat the
problem. However, none of the solutions specifically address the issue of case complexity
and are instead geared toward more efficient case management by actors involved in
criminal and civil cases. Although Sipes (1984) acknowledges that some cases are
atypical (perhaps because they are more complex), complex cases present difficulties in
implementing some of the various measures aimed at reducing court delay (i.e. setting
firm trial dates which may have to change based on various legal or procedural issues that
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can arise). In any event, Sipes’s (1984) work does not directly examine the nexus
between case complexity and delay. Additionally, Martin and Prescott (1981) define case
processing time as the time between the lower court’s initial ruling and the time that a
decision is rendered by an appellate court. Martin and Prescott (1981) provide a further
breakdown of appellate case processing time to account for the fact that various court
actors view case processing time in different ways and use different starting points. For
the current study, the researcher has selected a specific start time (i.e. following the
Florida Supreme Court’s direct appeal ruling) to make capturing delay simpler and more
consistent.
Hypotheses
Death penalty delay is steadily worsening in terms of the length of time that
defendants spend on death row (Latzer & Cauthen, 2007; Snell, 2011). Constitutionally,
Justice Breyer has argued that death penalty delay has essentially created a system that
serves no legitimate penological purpose and in many ways, presents the same issues of
arbitrariness the U.S Supreme Court attempted to remedy with the Furman and Gregg
decisions35 What remains uncertain is the degree to which case complexity lengthens the
amount of time defendants spend on death row.
There is some limited empirical support for the notion that case complexity
impacts case processing time (Cauthen & Latzer, 2008; 2000) and thus lengthens the
amount of time that defendants spend on death row. However, much of what we know
about the operationalization of complexity is confined to the political science and legal

35

See Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross (135 S. Ct. 2726, 2015).
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literature. Thus, the criminological enterprise would greatly benefit from a more thorough
examination of the nexus between case complexity and death penalty delay.
There is some evidence that federal judges are beginning to take notice of the
increasingly lengthy amount of time defendants awaiting execution are spending on death
row (see Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3rd 1050, Dist. Ct, C.D. Cal 2014). However, we
do not presently have answers regarding why such inordinate delay is becoming
commonplace. While it is conceivable that the appellate process is too cumbersome and
contributes significantly to the problem, there is still a great deal of uncertainty about
whether it is the nature of death penalty cases themselves that results in periods on death
row that for some defendants can span several decades. This research is an initial attempt
to shed some light on the question of delay in death sentences and whether the
complexity of death penalty cases contributes to this delay. Thus, this research is guided
by two primary questions: 1.) What constitutes delay and how should it be measured? and
2.) Does the complexity of death penalty cases contribute to the delay that defendants
experience?
Arguably, the number of legal issues present in a case before the U.S. Supreme
Court influences opinion writing, perhaps because such cases are more complex
(Johnson, 1999). It is possible that complex cases (as a function of the number of legal
issues present), influence the Florida Supreme Court during capital cases which could
also influence other courts in the appeals process as well. Thus, one operational definition
of case complexity for this research is the number of legal issues present in the Florida
Supreme Court’s ruling on a defendant’s direct appeal. This research hypothesizes a link
between case complexity and death penalty delay in the following manner:
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H1: An increase in the number of legal issues present in the Florida Supreme Court’s
direct appeal decision increases the likelihood of delay.
Johnson (1999) also notes that the number of legal rules cited influences opinion
writing at the U.S. Supreme Court, perhaps because an increased number of legal
authorities cited in a case is indicative of greater complexity. Thus, this research proposes
an additional operational definition of case complexity (the number of legal authorities
and rules cited in the Florida Supreme Court’s ruling on a defendant’s direct appeal).
Additionally, this research hypothesizes a link between case complexity and death
penalty delay in the following manner:
H2: An increase in the number of legal authorities and rules cited in the Florida Supreme
Court’s direct appeal decision increases the likelihood of delay.
Primary Independent Variables of Interest
The number of legal issues raised and legal authorities and rules implicated are
potentially key meausures of case complexity. Johnson (1999) finds that these two
variables, at a minimum, influence opinion writing at the U.S. Supreme Court, ostensibly
because there are more issues and rules to discuss. This research posits that the same
forces are potentially in play in Florida’s death penalty system. For the current study, the
variable Complexity 1 represents the total number of legal issues raised and it was coded
(1=1-3 issues, 2=4-6 issues, 3=7-10 issues and 4=11 or more issues). Additionally,
Complexity 2 represents the number of legal authorities and rules cited (authorities) and
was coded (1=1-9 authorities, 2=10-14 authorities, 3=15-19 authorities, 4=20-30
authorities, 5=31-40 authorities, 6=41-60 authorities and 7=61 or more authorities).
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Control Variables
Several relevant control variables were also considered in the current study. These
variables include the number of direct appeals filed with the Florida Supreme Court, the
length of the Florida Supreme Court’s direct appeal opinion, whether any judges in the
Florida Supreme Court drafted a dissenting opinion on direct appeal, the number of state
habeas appeals filed, the number of federal habeas appeals filed, the number of petitions
for certiorari defendants submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court, whether the jury rendered
a unanimous decision in sentencing, whether the defendant challenged any forensic
evidence presented at trial, the number of expert witnesses who testified at trial, whether
the defendant raised a competency dispute at trial, whether the defendant asserted some
sort of brain injury or deformity, the number of Florida 3.850 and 3.851 motions filed,
the number of issues raised in both the defendant’s and state’s appellate brief and the
length of each of these briefs. Table 4.2 in the following chapter presents all the
independent variables followed by a discussion of the coding mechanism for each
variable.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable of interest for the current study is delay. For purposes of
this research, delay is defined as the cumulative amount of time (measured in months)
that a defendant has spent on death row less the amount of time between sentencing and
the time required for the Florida Supreme Court to render a decision on a defendant’s
direct appeal. Where this resulting number exceeded the national average for time spent
on death row, it was coded as 1. Where the resulting number did not exceed the national
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average, as calculated by the Department of Justice, it was coded as 036. There is some
recognition that this measure is arbitrary37 and it may likely raise several additional
questions38; however, the calculation used here is merely a proxy measure of delay, albeit
an unstable one. This study is also exploratory. Thus, this definition will require
refinement as future studies attempt to examine this issue.
As a point of comparison, the researcher will also consider the count number of
years spent on death row since the trial court’s original verdict, irrespective of whether a
defendant’s time on death row exceeds the national average.
The impetus for defining delay in this manner is derived, in part, from the
Department of Justice’s calculation (see Snell, 2014) as well as Latzer & Cauthen’s
(2000; 2008) research on the capital appellate process. This definition of delay considers
the idea that death row inmates must spend at least some time on death row before their
appeals are litigated. Neubauer (1983), for instance, acknowledges that delay is often
viewed as negative but that some delay is necessary simply as a function of the time
required for cases to be litigated and resolved. Thus, Neubauer (1983) relies on case
processing time or the time required to litigate a criminal case from start to finish.
Neubauer (1983) views this as a more objective measure, however it is problematic for
purposes of this project given that total case processing time captures both what
Neubauer (1983) refers to as “normal” and “abnormal” case processing time. Neubauer’s

36

The average number of months was log transformed in order to address issues of skew.
It is implied that there is a normative measure for some established timeframe that
cases should spend on appellate review. However, there is no such measure as Nieves
(2006) points out.
38
Among other things, there is an ongoing debate regarding how to appropriately
measure case processing times in death penalty cases (see Hanson & Daley, 1995; Spurr,
2002).
37
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(1983) work is also focused specifically on the period between arrest and sentencing in
criminal cases and not the appeals process. Recognizing this limitation, this research will
proceed as described above.
Neubauer’s (1983) work is not the only study to examine case processing time. In
a study conducted by the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), the researchers
examined case processing time both in criminal and civil cases but did not devise a true
working definition of delay (see Trotter & Cooper, 1982). In both instances (i.e. criminal
and civil), the researchers simply identified various courts that were “faster” or “slower”
than others. However, the case processing timeline may change based on differences in
geographic locales (Trotter & Cooper, 1982). Thus, merely using median case processing
time is not enough and does not account for such local factors. In other words, this
method of determining when delay in case processing time is either present or not does
not reconcile what Neubauer (1983) describes as “normal” and “abnormal” case
processing time. Further, Luskin and Luskin (1986) examined several factors believed to
influence case processing time (defined by the authors as the time between arraignment
and disposition of a criminal case). Although instructive, their analysis does not set a
minimum threshold for delay. In other words, although many of the authors’ predicted
relationships between the causes of long case processing time and actual case processing
time hold true, questions remain about whether the relationships that they observed
constitute delay.
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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS
In this chapter, the specific analytic methods are presented. The major goal of this
chapter is to begin to explore some of the processes that may influence the length of time
that defendants who were sentenced between 1975 and 2013 have spent on death row and
ultimately the factors that impact delay. These years are used for a couple reasons
reasons. First, the earliest cases were being adjudicated a few years before and following
the reimposition of the death penalty following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in
Gregg, where arguably, the modern death penalty system came into existence. Second,
this year also marks the beginning of the time period that coincides with the longest
amount of time that a defendant has spent on death row in Florida (Thomas Knight and
Charles Foster; 38 years on death row as of 2013) who each petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court asserting a Lackey Claim. As mentioned in Chapter 3 (METHODS), the factors
that impact delay have been largely unexplored in the criminological literature. Thus, this
chapter seeks to lay out a comprehensive analytic method for determining how various
factors associated with case complexity and the appeals process may influence delay.
Descriptive Statistics under Study
The following table (Table 4.1) provides the descriptive statistics for the primary
demographic variables of interest.
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Table 4.1-Descriptive Statistics: Demographic Variables (N=406)
Gender

N

Percentage

S.D.

401

98.8

-

5

1.2

-

N

Percentage

S.D.

White

243

59.9

-

Black

148

36.5

-

Hispanic/Latino

15

3.6

-

N

Percentage

S.D.

North

180

44.3

-

Central

147

36.2

-

South

79

19.5

-

N

Mean (Years)

S.D.

Age (as of 2013)

-

47.9

10.93

Time on Death Row (as of 2013)

-

15.3

9.63

Male
Female
Race

Region

Table 4.1 reveals some noteworthy information about the inmates in the dataset.
As of 2013, the average time spent on death row was just over 15 years. The average age
of a Florida death row inmate as of 2013 was nearly 48 years old and most of these
inmates were white (59.9 percent) and overwhelmingly male (98.8 percent).
Next, Table 4.2 provides the descriptive statistics for the dependent variable
(Delay) and the independent variables of interest.
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Table 4.2-Descriptive Statistics (Dependent and
Independent Variables)
Delay

N

Percentage

S.D.

No Delay

209

51.5

-

Delay

197

48.5

-

N

Mean

S.D.

Direct Appeals

380

1.21

.41

Opinion Length (In Pages)

389

2.66

1.33

FSC Dissent

347

.33

.47

State Habeas Appeals

404

.71

.71

Federal Habeas Appeals

373

.79

.87

Number of USSC Certiorari

375

1.14

.65

Case Attribute Variables

N

Mean

S.D.

Jury Unanimity

403

.20

.40

Forensic Dispute

364

.30

.46

Number of Expert Witnesses

388

1.70

1.05

Competency Dispute

389

.68

.47

Brain Disorder

376

.58

.50

3.850 Motions

404

1.34

1.17

3.851 Motions

403

.79

.80

N

Mean

S.D.

Complexity 1 (Issues in the FSC)

401

2.70

.92

Complexity 2 (Number of Rules or Authorities)

397

4.66

1.88

Appellate Brief Issues

396

2.37

1.00

Appeals Process Variables

Case Complexity Variables
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Table 4.2-Descriptive Statistics (Dependent and Independent Variables) (cont.)
Appellate Brief Length (In Pages)

397

3.12

.98

State Reply Brief Issues

396

2.34

1.03

State Reply Brief Length (In Pages)

396

2.26

.67

For the current study, the researcher divided the variables in Table 4.2 into three
separate categories: appeals process variables, case attribute variables and case
complexity variables. The appeals process variables include the number of direct appeals
filed with the Florida Supreme Court (1=once, 2=multiple) as well as the length (in
pages) of the Florida Supreme Court’s initial direct appeal opinion (1=1-10, 2=11-20,
3=21-30, 4=31-50, 5=51 or more). Additionally, the researcher examined whether
notable relationships emerge when examining the presence or absence of a dissenting
opinion in the direct appeal ruling (0=No, 1=Yes) and the number of times a defendant
filed for state habeas relief (0=None, 1=Once, 2=Multiple). Other variables the researcher
considered were the number of federal habeas appeals filed (0=None, 1=Once,
2=Multiple) and how many times a defendant petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari (0=None, 1=Once, 2=Multiple).
At the case level, the researcher examined jury unanimity (0=Not Unanimous,
1=Unanimous), whether the defendant disputed any forensic evidence (0=No, 1=Yes),
the number of experts (psychologists or psychiatrists) that testified in a case (0=None,
1=1-2, 2=3, 3=4 or more), the presence or absence of a competency dispute (0=No,
1=Yes), the presence or absence of a claim of a brain disorder (0=No, 1=Yes) and the
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number of Florida 3.85039 (0=None, 1=One, 2=2-3, 3=4 or more) and 3.85140 (0=None,
1=One, 2=Multiple) motions filed in a case. Heise’s (2004) work provides the researcher
with some empirical basis for examining these variables. Heise (2004) identified several
variables that may make criminal cases more complex. Jury unanimity and the number of
expert witnesses are worthy of further examination given that Heise (2004) found these
two variables to be relatively strong indicators of case complexity.
Finally, the case complexity variables include Complexity 1 (1=1-3 issues, 2=4-6
issues, 3=7-10 issues, 4=11 or more issues), Complexity 2 (1=1-9 authorities, 2=10-14
authorities, 3=15-19 authorities, 4=20-30 authorities, 5=31-40 authorities, 6=41-60
authorities, 7=61 or more authorities), the number of appellate brief issues (1=1-3 issues,
2=4-6 issues, 3=7-10 issues, 4=11 or more issues), appellate brief length (1=1-50 pages,
2=51-74 pages, 3=75-100 pages, 4=101 or more pages), the number of issues raised in
the state’s reply (1=1-3 issues, 2=4-6 issues, 3=7-10 issues, 4=11 or more issues) and the
length of the state’s reply (1=1-50 pages, 2=51-100 pages, 3=101 or more pages).
For each type of variable, the researcher coded the variables in the above manner
based on the determination that such coding may be more conducive to binary logistic
regression and Poisson regression.
Binary Logistic Regression
For the current study, a series of binary logistic regressions was used to examine
the relationship between the independent variables and delay. Binary logistic regression

39

A 3.850 motion is a motion for post-conviction relief in the state of Florida often filed
following a guilty conviction, guily plea or no contest plea.
40
A 3.851 motion is a motion for post-conviction relief in the state of Florida specific to
death penalty cases that is often filed following a guilty conviction and subsequent death
sentence.
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is an appropriate method for analyzing the effects of either catergorical or continuous
variables on a dichotomous outcome (Peng, Lee & Ingersoll, 2002). The current study
tests the relationship between case complexity (defined by the number of legal issues
raised and the number of legal rules and authorities cited in the Florida Supreme Court’s
direct appeal opinion) against the binary outcome of delay (coded as 0=no delay and
1=delay). Specifically, given that logistic regression models are designed to calculate
odds ratios (Peng et al., 2002), the current study examined the odds that the independent
variables will be associated with an increased or decreased likelihood in the odds of delay
delay (see H1 and H2 in Chapter 3, METHODS).
Binary logistic regression is appropriate for the current analysis because of the
dichotomous dependent variable and the presence of one or more independent variables
(Hoffman, 2003). The researcher also ensured that two additional assumptions were met.
First, the data provides both independence of observations (each inmate in the sample is a
separate individual and is included only once in the analyses) and a dependent variable
with mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories (0=no delay and 1=delay). Second, the
researcher ensured that a linear relationship was present between the log transformed
independent variables and the dependent variable. The researcher tested this assumption
using the Box-Tidwell procedure (see Box & Tidwell, 1962) for each of the binary
logistic models. Across each of the logistic regression models, two of the log transformed
independent variables (number of direct appeals and 3.851 motions) had a significant
relationship with the dependent variable of delay. However, given the large sample size,
such a significant relationship does not indicate a lack of linearity overall, satisfying this
assumption (see Appendix A).
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Prior to finalizing the appellate-level variables for analysis, the researcher first
checked for multicollinearity among all the appellate-level independent variables using
the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). A VIF of exactly 1 indicates that there is no
correlation between any given two variables in the model. A VIF of greater than 10 is
considered a good indication that any two given independent variables are significantly
correlated and would likely need to be addressed by removing one of them from the
analysis. For the appeals process variables, the VIF ranged from1.01 to 2.18, indicating
that there is no significant correlation between any of the appeals process variables. The
researcher used the same process for testing for multicollinearity for the case-level
variables. For these variables, the VIF ranged from 1.01 to 1.66, indicating that no
significant correlation is present between any of the case attribute variables. As with the
previous two types of variables, the presence or absence of multicollinearity was assessed
using the VIF. For the case complexity variables, the VIF ranged from 1.06 to 1.87,
indicating that no significant correlation exists between any of the complexity variables.
An additional test for multicollinearity was performed by noting the condition indices for
each set of variables. Appendix B presents the minimum and maximum values for the
condtion indices for each group of variables.
Poisson Regression
As a point of comparison, the researcher also used series of Poisson regressions.
When using Poisson regression, however, the dependent variable was modified to reflect
time on death row (simply measured as a count number of years spent on death row in
Florida since sentencing).
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Poisson regression is utilized for count data for the dependent variable and it
measures changes in odds based on one or more independent variables (Coxe, West &
Aiken, 2009). In the current study, the researcher analyzed the effects of changes in
multiple independent variables on the increase or decrease in the likelihood of spending
more time on death row.
Given that the first two assumptions of Poisson regression were met (count data
for the dependent variable and one or more independent variables), prior to performing
the analysis, the researcher then checked whether three additional assumptions were met.
First, the researcher ensured that there was independence of observations given that each
individual in the dataset is a separate person and that no person was analyzed more than
once. Thus, it is not possible for any overlap to exist. Next, the researcher determined
whether the distribution of counts followed a Poisson distribution (Coxe, et al., 2009).
Finally, the researcher examined whether the mean and the variance of the model were
identical (Coxe, et al., 2009). The researcher tested this assumption by examining the
Pearson Chi Square value/degrees of freedom for each set of variables. In each case, this
value was greater than .05, indicating that the proposed model fits the data appropriately
(see Appendix C). Finally, the researcher further tested model fit by plotting the residuals
for each set of variables. With each set of variables (appeals process, case attribute and
case complexity), most of the residuals fell within two standard deviations of the mean;
further indicating that the proposed models fit the data (see Appendices D, E and F).
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CHAPTER 5

RESULTS
Binary Logistic Regression
Appeals Process Model. Table 5.1 presents the results of the appellate-level
variables using delay as the depenedent variable.
Table 5.1-Appeals Process Model
(Binary Logistic Regression)
Complexity 1

β

S.E.

Wald

Exp (β)

df

.93

.29

10.10

2.53***

1

1.09

.22

25.80

.34***

1

Direct Appeals

.36

.70

.27

Opinion Length

-.88

.25

12.97

.50

.52

.90

1.54

.43

.87

Number USSC Cert.
Constant

Complexity 2

FSC Dissent
State Habeas Appeals
Federal Habeas Appeals

1.44
.41***

1
1

1.64

1

12.91

4.64***

1

.31

7.85

2.38**

1

1.35

.45

9.23

3.87**

1

1.10

1.35

.66

2.99

1

*p≤.05 **p≤.01 ***p≤.001
Table 5.1 reveals several positive and significant relationships between the
appellate-level variables and delay. Notably, Complexity 1 was associated with a 153%
increase in the odds of delay. Other positive relationships included state habeas appeals
being associated with a 364% increase in the odds of delay, federal habeas appeals being
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associated with a 138% increase in the odds of delay and an increase in the number of
petitions for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court being associated with a 287% increase
in the odds of delay. Complexity 2, on the other hand, was associated with a 66%
decrease in the odds of delay while state Supreme Court opinion length resulted in a 59%
decrease in the odds of delay. The number of direct appeals and the presence of a
dissenting opinion in the Florida Supreme Court were also associated with increased odds
of delay. However, neither achieved statistical significance.
Case Attribute Model. Table 5.2 presents the results of the case-level variables
using delay as the depenedent variable.
Table 5.2-Case Attribute Model
(Binary Logistic Regression)
Complexity 1

β

S.E.

Wald

Exp (β)

df

1.15

.32

13.03

3.15***

1

-1.52

.24

39.08

.22***

1

Jury Unanimity

.14

.67

.04

1.15

1

Forensic Dispute

-.37

.59

.38

.69

1

.45

.30

2.34

1.57

1

Competency Dispute

-.53

.78

.46

.59

1

Brain Disorder

-.40

.73

.30

.67

1

3.850 Motions

2.79

.42

44.71

16.23***

1

3.851 Motions

.43

.36

1.45

1.54

1

-.56

1.26

.19

.57

1

Complexity 2

Num. Expert Witnesses

Constant
*p≤.05 **p≤.01 ***p≤.001

Like the appellate-level variables, positive and significant relationships emerged
in the Case Attribute Model. Complexity 1 was associated with a 215% increase in the
odds of delay. A particularly notable result in this model is observed when examining
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3.850 motions, which were associated with a 1,523% increase in the odds of delay and
statistically significant. Complexity 2 was also statistically significant but associated with
a 78% decrease in the likelihood of delay. No other variables in the model achieved
statistical significance.
Case Complexity Model. Table 5.3 presents the results of the complexity
variables only; using delay as the depenedent variable.
Table 5.3-Case Complexity Model
(Binary Logistic Regression)
Complexity 1

β

S.E.

Wald

Exp (β)

df

1.04

.20

27.64

2.84***

1

Complexity 2

-1.28

.13

99.54

.28***

1

Appellate Brief Issues

-.18

.19

.89

.84

1

Appellate Brief Length

-.02

.18

.02

.98

1

State Reply Brief Issues

-.09

.19

.20

.92

1

State Reply Brief Length

-.03

.26

.02

.97

1

Constant

3.96

.74

28.54

52.54***

1

*p≤.05 **p≤.01 ***p≤.001
As in the first two binary logistic models, both Complexity 1 and Complexity 2
emerged as significant, yet only Complexity 1 was associated with increased odds of
delay (184% increase). Complexity 2, as observed in the other models was associated
with a decrease in the odds of delay (72% decrease in this model). Neither the number of
legal issues present in the defendant’s brief to the Florida Supreme Court nor the state’s
reply brief emerged as significant. In addition, while state Supreme Court opinion length
emerged as statistically significant in the Appeals Process model (albeit associated with
decreased odds in the presence of delay), neither the length of the defendant’s brief nor
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the length of the state’s reply brief achieved statistical significance in the Case
Complexity Model.
Grand Model. Table 5.4 presents the results of the Grand Model for all
statistically significant variables across each of the original three binary logistic models.
Table 5.4-Grand Model (Binary
Logistic Regression)
Complexity 1

β

S.E.

Wald

Exp (β)

df

2.14*

1

.76

.32

5.63

-1.18

.27

19.15

.31***

1

-.76

.29

6.78

.47**

1

State Habeas Appeals

.55

.55

.99

1.73

1

Federal Habeas Appeals

.71

.37

3.69

2.04

1

Number USSC Cert.

1.40

.53

6.95

4.07**

1

3.850 Motions

1.81

.35

26.87

6.09***

1

.43

1.15

.14

1.53

1

Complexity 2
Opinion Length

Constant
*p≤.05 **p≤.01 ***p≤.001

When modeling each of the statistically significant variables together, Complexity
1 was still associated with increased odds of delay. Although Complexity 1 emerged as
slightly less significant in the Grand Model, it still had a greater effect on the outcome
than Complexity 2 (114% increase and a 69% decrease in odds respectively). The number
of 3.850 motions filed remained significant but had less of an effect than when modeled
with the other case-level variables (509% increase in odds). Also, the number of U.S.
Supreme Court petitions for certiorari also emerged as significant in the Grand Model
and was associated with a 307% increase in the odds of delay. Finally, Florida Supreme
Court opinion length continued to emerge as significant in this final model but was again
associated with a decrease in the odds of delay (53%).
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Poisson Regression
Appeals Process Model. Table 5.5 presents the results of the same appellatelevel variables but instead examines time on death row as the dependent variable.
Table 5.5-Appeals Process Model
(Poisson Regression)
Complexity 1

.09

.03

Wald
Χ²
11.42

Complexity 2

-.04

.01

7.59

.96**

1

Direct Appeals

.19

.04

21.10

1.21***

1

Opinion Length

-.15

.02

39.64

.86***

1

FSC Dissent

.03

.04

.46

State Habeas Appeals

.21

.03

Federal Habeas Appeals

.18

Number USSC Cert.
(Intercept)

β

S.E.

Exp (β)
1.09**

df
1

1.03

1

39.20

1.23***

1

.03

34.73

1.20***

1

.12

.04

9.85

1.13**

1

2.30

.12

386.24

9.98***

1

*p≤.05 **p≤.01 ***p≤.000
Table 5.5 reveals that many of the same appellate-level variables achieved
statistical significance like in the binary logistic model. Complexity 1 (9% increase),
number of direct appeals (21% increase), state habeas appeals (23% increase), federal
habeas appeals (20% increase) and the number of petitions for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court (13% increase) were all statistically significant and associated with
increases in the odds of greater time on death row. Notably, the number of direct appeals
achieved statistical significance in this model but not in the previous binary logistic
model. Also, Complexity 2 and state Supreme Court opinion length were associated with
decreases in the outcome variable and each achieved statistical significance as in the
binary logistic model. Finally, the presence of a dissenting opinion in the Florida
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Supreme Court was associated with a slight increase in the odds of greater time on death
row but did not achieve statistical significance.
Case Attribute Model. Table 5.6 presents the results of the same case-level
variables but instead examines time on death row as the outcome variable.
Table 5.6-Case Attribute
Model (Poisson Regression)
Complexity 1

β
.09

.02

12.61

1.09***

1

Complexity 2

-.09

.01

37.22

.92***

1

Jury Unanimity

.03

.06

.28

1.03

1

Forensic Dispute

.07

.04

2.52

1.07

1

Num. Expert Witnesses

.07

.02

8.86

1.07**

1

-.10

.06

2.99

.90

1

Brain Disorder

.05

.05

.86

1.05

1

3.850 Motions

.40

.03

242.47

1.48***

1

3.851 Motions

.04

.02

2.26

1.04

1

2.05

.11

341.35

7.78***

1

Competency Dispute

(Intercept)

S.E.

Wald Χ²

Exp (β)

df

*p≤.05 **p≤.01 ***p≤.001
Table 5.6 reveals that Complexity 1 is again associated with increased odds of
greater time on death row (9%) and, as in previous models, statistically significant.
Complexity 2 is once again statistically significant but associated with a decrease in the
outcome (8%). Interestingly, the number of expert witnesses who testified at trial was
statistically significant in this model (although not in the binary logistic model) and
associated with a slight increase in the odds of increased time on death row (7%). Finally,
the number of 3.850 motions was associated with increases in the outcome but not nearly
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to the extent observed in the binary logistic model (48% increase in the odds of increased
time on death row).
Case Complexity Model. Table 5.7 presents the results of the complexity
variables examining time on death row as the dependent variable.
Table 5.7-Case Complexity
Model (Poisson Regression)
Complexity 1

β

S.E.

Wald Χ²

Exp (β)

df

.11

.03

13.44

1.12***

1

Complexity 2

-.18

.01

182.26

.83***

1

Appellate Brief Issues

.04

.03

1.42

1.04

1

Appellate Brief Length

.04

.03

1.27

1.04

1

State Reply Brief Issues

-.09

.04

6.26

.92*

1

State Reply Brief Length

-.03

.04

.66

.97

1

(Intercept)

3.28

.13

629.14

26.61***

1

*p≤.05 **p≤.01 ***p≤.001
Table 5.7 reveals similar results with the complexity variables. Complexity 1 and
Complexity 2 again achieved statistical significance and were associated with similar
effects on the dependent variable (12% increase in odds and 17% decreased odds
respectively). Notably, the number of state reply brief issues achieved statistical
significance in this model but was associated with an 8% decrease in the odds of
increased time on death row.
Grand Model. Table 5.8 presents the results of the Grand Model for all
statistically significant variables across each of the three Poisson models.
Table 5.8-Grand Model
(Poisson Regression)
Complexity 1

β

S.E.

.09

.02

16.01

1.09***

1

Complexity 2

-.03

.01

5.55

.97*

1
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Wald Χ²

Exp (β)

df

Table 5.8-Grand Model
(Poisson Regression) (cont.)
Direct Appeals

β

S.E.

Wald Χ²

Exp (β)

df

.16

.04

17.71

1.17***

1

-.11

.02

28.39

.90***

1

State Habeas Appeals

.10

.03

10.46

1.11**

1

Federal Habeas Appeals

.10

.03

11.00

1.10**

1

Number USSC Cert.

.05

.03

2.28

1.05

1

Num. Expert Witnesses

.02

.02

1.17

1.02

1

3.850 Motions

.24

.02

106.35

1.28***

1

State Reply Brief Issues

-.04

.02

4.46

.96**

1

(Intercept)

2.10

.10

430.35

8.13***

1

Opinion Length

*p≤.05 **p≤.01 ***p≤.001
Table 5.8 reveals that when modeled together, several variables maintain their
significance and have similar effects on time on death row. Complexity 1 and Complexity
2 were again statistically significant. Complexity 1 was associated with an increase in the
odds of more time on death row and Complexity 2 was associated with a decrease in the
odds of time more time on death row (9% increase and a 3% decrease respectively).
Other statistically significant variables associated with increases in the odds of greater
time on death row in this model include the number of direct appeals (17% increase), the
number of state habeas appeals (11% increase), the number of federal habeas appeals
(10% increase) and the number of 3.850 motions filed (28% increase). Two other
variables were statistically significant but associated with decreases in the odds of greater
time on death row. Florida Supreme Court opinion length was associated with a 10%
decrease in the odds of greater time on death row while the number of issues present in
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the state’s reply brief was associated with a 4% decrease in the odds of more time on
death row.
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CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION
Overall, several key relationships emerged across all of the analyses that should
prompt further inquiry into the relationship between case complexity and either death
penalty delay or time on death row. Undue delay in litigating and imposing capital
punishment in the United States creates problems in terms of the psychological impact on
death row inmates41, cost to local and state governments compared to non-capital
sanctions42 and the sheer backlog of capital cases in state court systems which creates an
unnecessary and untenable burden on the various actors in the justice system. Thus, the
field of Criminology would benefit from more studies that address the problem of delay
as more than merely a function of the number of state and federal level appeals afforded
to capital defendants. An understanding of case complexity and other variables’ impact
on delay and time on death row will not result in cases that are less complex but may help
criminal justice actors either streamline the process in order to reduce unnecessary delay
or narrow the class of death-eligible defendants; which was the U.S. Supreme Court’s
goal when it decided Gregg v. Georgia. What follows is a discussion of the results as well
as what these results could mean for policy and future research.

41

See Anderson et al., (2000); Benjamin & Lux (1975); Grassian (1983) Haney (2003) and
Haney (1993).
42
See Johnson & Quigley (2019) and Lundberg (2019) for recent discussions of key findings
related to such costs.
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An increase in the number of appeals was associated with an increased likelihood
of delay and greater time on death row. State habeas appeals, federal habeas appeals and
U.S. Supreme Court petitions for certiorari all occur well after the Florida Supreme Court
renders its initial direct appeal ruling and likely occur beyond the point at which a
defendant’s time on death row exceeds the national average, thus resulting in delay (see
Snell, 2014). Many of these appeals may even be filed and adjudicated after a defendant
is already in the delay period. This probably explains the relatively great effects for each
of these three types of appeals in both the binary logistic and Poisson models. Although
not statistically significant, a dissenting opinion in the Florida Surpreme Court being
associated with a slight increase in the odds of greater time on death row is notable. A
dissenting opinion is indicative of disagreement among one or more judges. Such
disagreements may later reveal further issues that will arise in subsequent appeals which
could, in turn, lengthen a defendant’s time on death row.
It was hypothesized that Complexity 1 would be associated with an increased
likelihood of delay, a relationship that emerged in both appellate-level models. In their
research, Cauthen and Latzer (2000) noted that the number of legal issues present likely
contributes to longer case processing time. Longer case processing time, in turn, leads to
possible delay. The number of legal rules and authorities cited in a case (Complexity 2)
resulted in a decrease in the odds of delay in the binary logistic models and a decreased
likelihood in the odds of greater time on death row in the Poisson models. The higher
odds associated with the number of legal issues is likely a function of these same issues
being the actual subject of subsequent appeals, which when greater, would increase the
amount of time required to exhaust these appeals. The number of legal rules and
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authorities cited, on the other hand, may not be indicative of more issues that will arise on
appeal and may simply reflect a particular judge’s preference in what to reference when
laying out the various issues in the direct appeal opinion. It is uncertain, however, why
citing a greater number of authorities would lead to decreased odds in delay and greater
time on death row. However, it is noteworthy that this result remains consistent across all
the models in both analyses.
At first glance, it may be surprising that the number of direct appeals filed did not
achieve statistical significance in the binary logistic model. This could simply be due to
the relatively small percentage of cases in which the defendant filed multiple direct
appeals (only 79 of the 380 cases). However, in the Poisson model, the number of direct
appeals filed was associated with more time on death row and statistically significant.
This result reinforces findings by Latzer and Cauthen (2007) noting that direct appeals in
the New Jersey Supreme Court can take 2-4 years to fully litigate. This could be due to
the fact that direct appeals to the Florida Supreme Court are filed early in the process and
possibly adjudicated before the delay period begins. Thus, this would not increase the
odds of delay but would increase the odds of greater time on death row. Further, the
number of expert witnesses who testified during the trial may be indicative of subsequent
issues that arise on appeal (i.e. competence, diminished brain capacity) and thus explain
the increased odds of greater time on death row. This variable, however, did not achieve
statistical significance in the binary model which could simply mean that such issues
arise on appeal early in the appeals process prior to the delay period.
The complexity variables showed similar effects in the Case Attribute models.
Complexity 1 and Complexity 2 are once again noteworthy. Even when controlling for
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various case-level variables, Complexity 1 still emerged as a predictor of increased
likelihood of delay whereas Complexity 2 was associated with decreased odds of delay.
Similarly, in the Poisson model, Complexity 1 was associated with increased odds of
greater time on death row while Complexity 2 was associated with decreased odds of
more time on death row. In each case, this simply may be indicative of the fact that the
legal issues present are what predicts a lengthier overall process as opposed to differences
in what judges choose to cite in the direct appeal opinion.
The high increase in the odds of delay associated with the number of 3.850
motions filed may be due to the relatively high number of defendants who filed multiple
3.850 motions. As noted previously, 3.850 motions are more general in nature. This may
explain why so many more defendants file multiple 3.850 motions versus 3.851 motions;
which are more specific to death penalty cases. In any event, 3.850 motions, particularly
the second 3.850 motion and beyond may be filed later in the death penalty process close
to or during the period of delay. This may explain why this effect is so great in the binary
logistic model.
Complexity 1 (in the Case Complexity models and others) has consistently been
shown to impact delay (time on death row in the Poisson models) in the hypothesized
direction. Whether controlling for various appellate-level variables, case-level variables
or other case complexity variables, the number of legal issues raised (Complexity 1) and
the number of legal rules or authorities cited (Complexity 2) achieved statistical
significance in all the binary logistic and Poisson models even though their effects on the
outcome were vastly different.
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A hypothetical example of how Complexity 2 may not factor into an increase in
the odds of delay or greater time on death row may center on one judge summarily
dismissing a defendant’s claim that certain aggravating factors were not present while
another judge may outline previous cases (authorities) in which such aggravating factors
were present. In either case, the fact that a defendant is arguing against the presence of
various aggravating circumstances is what remains consistent and subject to a subsequent
appeal. The number of citations are free to fluctuate based on the judge drafting the
opinion. Additionally, sentencing juries (comprised of lay persons), are tasked with
determining the presence of various mitigating and aggravating factors in deciding
whether to impose a death sentence. Juries are not tasked with determining which legal
authorities support the presence of an aggravating factor. Thus, the true complexity of a
case probably lies within the presence of the legal issue itself and not necessarily whether
a judge in the Florida Supreme Court cites various authorities in their opinion.
Even when modeled with the other statistically significant varibles, Complexity 1
remained consistent in terms of significance and increased odds of delay and time on
death row. This may be indicative of the ability of the number of legal issues present to
serve as a reliable indicator of the increase in the odds of delay and time on death row,
regardless of what other variables are modeled with it. Complexity 2 still achieves
statistical significance in both grand models and lends further credence to the notion that
the number of authorities cited still fails to be a reliable indicator of the likelihood of
delay and greater time on death row. The fact that the number of U.S. Supreme Court
petitions for certiorari filed and the number of 3.850 motions filed achieved statistical
significance and were associated with increased odds in the presence of delay is once
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again likely indicative of the fact that such appeals are filed later in the process.
Petitioning the U.S. Supreme Court is usually done at or near the end of the appeals
process, perhaps during the delay period. Thus, it is not surprising that these petitions are
associated with increased odds in delay. Finally, it is possible that Florida Supreme Court
opinion length is associated with decreases in both the odds of delay and greater time on
death row because a thorough explanation of the issues on direct appeal decreases the
length of time needed to address other issues in subsequent appeals. Notably, these
results contradict previous findings by Cauthen and Latzer (2008) who found that opinion
length was related to a slight increase in case processing time.
Several other variables achieved statistical significance and predict greater odds
of more time on death row in the grand Poisson model. Not surprisingly, all these
variables are centered on the appeals process and an increase in the number of various
petitions and motions filed. These variables include state-level appellate variables (the
number of direct appeals, the number of state habeas appeals and the number of 3.850
motions filed) as well as the number of federal habeas appeals filed. Intuitively, filing a
greater number of these appeals will be associated with greater odds of increased time on
death row even if they are not necessarily associated with delay.
Implications for Policy and Practice
The challenge with concluding that complex cases, at least in terms of the number
of legal issues present in a case, contribute to increased odds of delay or time on death
row lies in what policymakers can do with this information. Even if this study, combined
with subsequent studies that address the methodological limitations of the current study
lead to the same conclusions, specific policy decisions may be difficult. No matter how
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one defines or measures case complexity, death penalty cases are not likely to become
less complex. As Eighth Amendment jurisprudence continues to address the various
issues surrounding the death penalty, this is likely to lead to even more factors that courts
will have to consider in cases on appeal. Regarding Lackey Claims, Justice Breyer’s
concerns about state-created delay are not likely to be rectified. One could anticipate that
more defendants will try to petition the U.S. Supreme Court asserting Lackey Claims as
time on death row and delay continue to increase. It will be interesting to see whether
Justice Thomas will continue to argue against Lackey Claims on the grounds that
defendants who exhaust the full range of appeals cannot subsequently assert an Eighth
Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment (Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990).
A potential moral and political issue that may be difficult to reconcile is the issue
of speeding up a defendant’s path to death. While extended periods of death row
confinement may certainly contribute to negative impacts on a defendant’s psychological
well-being (see Grassian, 1983) or cost more for taxpayers, cases cannot simply be made
less complex. In addition, decreasing the amount of time it takes to execute a defendant
by streamlining the process potentially leads to executions that are too hasty, especially in
the face of numerous legal issues that may be present. It may be difficult to imagine
certain political circles supporting a candidate who favored more expedient executions,
particularly if it is perceived that defendants’ civil rights are being diminished. However,
this is essentially what occurred with the passage of the Timely Justice Act of 2013.43
This legislation, signed into law by former Florida Governor Rick Scott, has
among some of its key provisions the requirement that a death warrant be signed within

43

See Floirda Statute 922.052(2)(a).
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30 days following clemency and that executions be carried out within 180 days of the
death warrant being signed. Overall, such timelines probably do not have the effect of
significantly speeding up the overall path to execution. This is because clemency review
occurs very late in the death penalty process after many other appeals have been
exhausted. However, the law is controversial given that any attempt to speed up a death
penalty process fraught with numerous errors throughout may be viewed as unethical and
ineffective at addressing the actual issues in the system. It may be akin to ignoring the
more obvious issues that occur early in the process and trying to attach an unrelated
solution at the end. Nonetheless, the law remains in effect even though the results of this
study suggest that it may be ineffective at combating the more overarching issues of
delay and increased time on death row.
Another piece of legislation worth noting is the Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).44 AEDPA, among other things, places a one year
limit on state prisoners attempting to file habeas corpus appeals in federal court and
specifies that absent certain exceptions, state-level defendants must exhaust state-level
remedies before petitioning for a federal writ of habeas corpus, a rule known as
procedural default.45 Given that state-level appeals typically several years to exhaust, this
likely results in a significant limitation on the availability of a key federal remedy.

44

See Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (Public Law 104–132, 1996).
A couple key exceptions to this rule which would permit the defendant to file for
habeas relief in federal court without exhausting state-level appeals are lack of exhaustion
based on prejudice or a significant miscarriage of justice (Anti-Terrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (Public Law 104–132, 1996).
45
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Limitations/Directions for Future Research
Given that this study is among the first of its kind, subsequent studies should
address the various methodological and analytical limitations of the current study. First,
future studies would benefit from data and methods that provide more predictive power
than binary logistic regression or Poisson regression. One alternative method is the ChiSquare Automatic Interaction Detector (CHAID) which can also be used to test for
interaction effects among the various independent variables (Kane, 1999). An
understanding of how various interactions impact the dependent variable of delay would
provide a richer understanding of some of the processes at work in the current study.
Further, the dependent variable will continue to need refinement in future studies. The
current study has proposed one operational definition of delay but it is possible that delay
would be better measured by a standard period of months or years and not necessarily the
national average for time on death row. Perhaps using a state’s average (10.93 years in
the current study) as opposed to the national average would be better given that death
penalty systems can differ greatly between states.
One could also argue that this study merely addresses the reasons that cases
become old and that there is little to no difference between cases that are old and cases
where delay is present. However, the distinction lies in having a threshold for delay
which informs us of when cases have become unacceptably old. While these two
concepts are related, “old” is a standard that can be defined however one chooses while a
specific definition of delay can be studied empirically and used to make informed policy
decisions.
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In addition, future studies should attempt to cover states beyond Florida that have
relatively high death row populations yet carry out so few executions that inmates spend
lengthy periods on death row. The researcher also relied on Snell’s calculation of the
national average for time on death row, but this calculation does not account for any
periods of acceptable delay (i.e. the time between initial sentencing and a state appellate
courts’ ruling on direct appeal) which was considered in this study. A future study would
perhaps provide a more accurate determination of delay if Snell’s figures were
recalculated to account for the period between sentencing and a direct appeal decision.
Future researchers would be wise to account for this lag when determining a national
average for time on death row.
Finally, case complexity could vary between inmates in the study as the available
case law cited or even the legal issues that arise would be different for an inmate
sentenced in the 1970’s versus an inmate sentenced in the 2010’s. Perhaps a study that
subdivides the sample into various time frames based on relevant cut points where death
penalty jurisprudence significantly changed (i.e. U.S. Supreme Court rulings in Gregg,
Ford or Atkins) would provide a unique opportunity to better observe what impacts
changes in the law have on delay and time on death row.
Conclusion: A New Standard for Capital Punishment?
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gregg v. Georgia (428 U.S. 153), the
Court has struck down practices in numerous states’ death penalty systems that would
have diminshed the rights of death row defendants46. While death row defendants can

46

See Jurek v. Texas (428 U.S. 262, 1976), Woodson v. North Carolina (428 U.S. 280,
1976), Lockett v. Ohio (438 U.S. 538, 1978), Zant v. Stevens (462 U.S. 862, 1983), Caldwell
v. Mississippi (472 U.S. 320, 1985) for a range of cases involving the consideration of
aggravating and mitigating factors.
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challenge their death sentences on several grounds, the Court’s protections have
arguably, and ironically, contributed to delay. It is not accurate to say the Court has made
capital cases more complex. However, the ability of defendants to challenge their death
sentences on a progressively increasing number of grounds is a direct result of the
protections the Court has afforded capital defendants over the last several decades.
Following the end of the nation’s four-year de facto moratorium on the death
penalty that occurred as a result of the Court’s decision in Gregg, the Court’s goal was to
encourage states to draft new death penalty statutes that would eliminate the arbitrary and
capricious nature with which capital punishment was being imposed. The death penalty,
it was said, should be reserved only for the worst of the worst (Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238, 1972; Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2015; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
1976). Today, however, one could argue that the Court’s protections have created the
same issues of arbitrariness and capriciousness that such protections were meant to
prevent. If this is true, what is the solution? One could posit a range of solutions from all
out abolition of the death penalty to the less practical and virtually impossible solution of
reducing the number of appeals afforded to capital defendants. It would also be
impractical to deprive a capital defendant of his or her ability to raise issues of
competence to stand trial, dispute forensic evidence presented at trial, argue that a brain
disorder reduces their criminal culpability or raise any number of issues that are
commonly subjects of state and federal appeals. If states and the federal government
continue to keep their death penalty statutes on the books, how will the Court’s goal of
only sentencing and executing the worst of the worst in a non-arbitrary manner be
achieved? Is this goal even attainable?
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The legal standard for a criminal conviction in every jurisdiction is guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. While it can be difficult to come up with a blanket definition of this
concept, it has been defined partially as,
“…the evidence is fully satisfied, all the facts are proven and guilt is established.”
(FindLaw, 2019).
Defining reasonable doubt alone is also useful. Reasonable doubt has been defined as,
“A doubt especially about the guilt of a criminal defendant that arises or remains upon
fair and thorough consideration of the evidence or lack thereof.” (Merriam-Webster,
2019).
Regardless of how either concept is defined, the standard for criminal conviction
falls below absolute certainty yet above the well-known standard of probable cause,
which is necessary for arrest. However, probable cause arrests and convictions beyond a
reasonable doubt occur in many contexts and for any number of crimes, minor and
serious. Capital cases though, are different given the finality and irreversibility of death.
They have been treated as such for several decades. Yet to ensure that the death penalty is
reserved for only the worst of the worst, the American justice system continues to apply
the same legal standard for imposing it. The result has been a death penalty system in
several states that sentences many people to death who will never be executed.
What may be necessary is an enhanced way for prosecutors to determine whether
they will seek the death penalty in a particular case. This new method would still use the
bifurcated process currently in place by which death penalty cases are adjudicated. Such a
method, however, would require prosecutors to apply a rule that assesses a defendant in a
way that exceeds the standard of either probable cause or guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. This proposed new method for seeking the death penalty could include the
following:
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1. A prosecutor’s determination that enough evidence exists that is likely to lead to a
trial jury finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in a capital murder case;
2. A prosecutor’s determination that a sentencing jury is likely to unanimously
determine the following:
a. A state’s minimum threshold for aggravating factors has been met;
b. Those aggravating factors outweigh any and all mitigating factors;
c. The evidence of a capital defendant’s guilt is so overwhelming that no
fathomable reason currently exists or could foreseeably exist that
would EVER undermine the trial jury’s determination of guilt or the
sentencing jury’s imposition of the death penalty.
Since the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Gregg, sentencing juries have been
required to consider aggravating and mitigating factors and guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt has long been the standard for conviction in criminal trials. However, section 2(C)
of the proposed new guidelines above provides a new, albeit very high threshold for
prosecutors to seek the death penalty. Prosecutors would now be required to make an
additional determination of whether potential guilt beyond a reasonable doubt extends to
a level of culpability that approaches certainty, even if certainty cannot be achieved. An
increasingly growing body of science surrounding the use of DNA evidence, while not
necessary to discuss here, lends credence to the notion that a standard of near certainty is
possible. DNA evidence would still need to be assessed in light of other factors.
However, DNA provides a very powerful method of supporting guilt and, conversely,
proving innocence.
In the end, criminal cases are complex and are probably never going to become
less complex. The U.S. Supreme Court has for decades afforded capital defendants an
increasing number of protections and given the severity and finality of death, rightfully
so. However, American death row inmates continue to spend longer and longer periods of
time on death row and a viable solution, short of all out abolition of the practice, seems at
first glance difficult to achieve. However, if the death penalty is to remain on the books in
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state and federal jurisdictions, years of research (a fraction of it outlined in this study),
Justice Breyer’s recognition of the validity of Lackey Claims and Judge Carney’s
analysis in Jones establish that death penalty delay is a problem worth addressing. The
problem is getting worse, but it is also gaining recognition despite the dearth of research
into its causes. If the goal is to ensure that the death penalty is truly reserved for the worst
of the worst and to address the myriad issues created by death penalty delay, it is possible
that the solution lies in creating higher standards for seeking the death penalty such that
those who are ultimately sentenced to death and choose to exhaust their appeals truly
represent the most serious cases. If a prosecutor cannot determine that a case likely
achieves a threshold greater than our current conception of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, then perhaps seeking a sentence of life without the possibility of parole is best. A
method that forces prosecutors to more carefully consider cases at the beginning stages of
the process may better serve to achieve the goals of the U.S. Supreme Court. In addition,
such a method serves to mitigate Justice Breyer’s concerns about state-created delay,
significantly cut costs to states in maintaining their death penalty systems and diminish
what in many states is an unworkable backlog of capital cases.
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APPENDIX A
BOX-TIDWELL PROCEDURE
Variable
Appeals Process Variables

Sig.

Direct Appeals_LN

.020

Opinion Length_LN

.293

FSC Dissent_LN

.506

State Habeas Appeals_LN

.720

Federal Habeas Appeals_LN

.696

Number USSC Cert_LN

.302

Case Attribute Variables
Jury Unanimity_LN

.895

Forensic Dispute_LN

.908

Num. Expert Witnesses_LN

.081

Competency Dispute_LN

.954

Brain Disorder_LN

.700

3.850 Motions_LN

.194

3.851 Motions_LN

.050

Case Complexity Variables
Complexity 1_LN

.682

Complexity 2_LN

.965
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Case Complexity Variables
(cont.)

Sig.

Appellate Brief Issues_LN

.806

Appellate Brief Length_LN

.846

State Reply Brief Issues_LN

.510

State Reply Brief Length_LN

.225
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APPENDIX B
CONDITION INDICES
Minimum Condition Index
Value
Appeals Proc.
Variables

1.00

Maximum
Condition
Index Value
16.51

Case
Attr.Variables

1.00

14.56

Case Comp.
Variables

1.00

13.13
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APPENDIX C
PEARSON CHI SQUARE COEFFICIENTS
Appeals Process
Variables

Case Attribute
Variables

Value

744.57

778.18

Case
Complexity
Variables
1587.15

df

316

314

373

Value/df

2.36

2.48

4.26
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APPENDIX D
POISSON RESIDUALS FOR APPEALS PROCESS VARIABLES
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APPENDIX E
POISSON RESIDUALS FOR CASE ATTRIBUTE VARIABLES
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APPENDIX F
POISSON RESIDUALS FOR CASE COMPLEXITY VARIABLES
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